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Abstract In modeling the effects of the Person-Case Constraint (PCC), a common
claim is that 3rd person “is not a person”. However, while this claim does work in
the syntax, it creates problems in the morphology. For example, characterizing the
well-known “spurious se effect” in Spanish simply cannot be done without reference
to 3rd person. Inspired by alternatives to underspeciﬁcation that have emerged in
phonology (e.g., Calabrese, 1995), a revised featural system is proposed, whereby
syntactic agreement may be relativized to certain values of a feature, in particular,
the contrastive and marked values. The range of variation in PCC effects is shown
to emerge as a consequence of the parametric options allowed on a Probing head,
whereastherepresentationofpersonremainsconstantacrossmodulesofthegrammar
and across languages.
Keywords Third person · Spurious se · Person case constraint · Me lui · Clitic
clusters · Multiple agree · Person features · Contrastive speciﬁcation
1 Introduction: third person is a person, too!
This study is an attempt to provide featural commensurability between syntactic
researchers working on Person-Case effects (Bonet, 1991) and morphological
Conversations with and suggestions by Elena Anagnostopoulou, Karlos Arregi, Jonathan Bobaljik,
Eulàlia Bonet, Seth Cable, Oana Ciucivara, Carmen Dobrovie-Sorin, Daniel Harbour, Heidi Harley,
Jim Harris, Susana Huidobro, Conor Quinn, Norvin Richards, and Jochen Trommer have greatly
assisted the shape and scope of this paper. Many thanks are also due to Marcel den Dikken, two
anonymous NLLT reviewers, and Welton Blount for their careful reading, many remarks leading to
improvements in clarity and solidity of argumentation, and editorial keenness. An early version of
this paper appeared in Harvard Working Papers in Linguistics Volume 11.
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researchers working on syncretisms and paradigm structure. A simple example
introduces the problem: Modern Greek and Catalan do not tolerate two 1st/2nd
person(henceforth1/2)argumentsofaditransitiveverb(thestrongPCC),andSpanish
does not tolerate a 3rd person dative along with a 1/2 accusative within ditransitives.
TakingAnagnostopoulou’s(2005)account(towhichthispaperowesgreatintellectual
debts)asanexemplar,wecanmodelthePCCeffectsastheresultofadifferenceinthe
featural representation between 1/2 and 3rd person arguments. A common claim is
that 3rd person “is not a person” (Kayne, 2000). However, while this claim does work
in the syntax, it creates problems in the morphology. For example, characterizing the
well-known “spurious se effect” in Spanish (Bonet, 1995; Perlmutter, 1971) simply
cannot be done without reference to 3rd person. We must therefore seek a featural
characterization of 3rd person that does not rob it of its ability to condition *le lo
effects.
I will henceforth call proponents/analyses based on the “3rd person has no person
feature” view the 3noP view (e.g., among others, Anagnostopoulou (2005), Adger
and Harbour (2006), Bejar and Rezac (2003), Harley and Ritter (2002)).1 In Sect. 2, I
will provide a demonstration, based on evidence from Spanish clitic interactions, that
3noP cannot be upheld. In Sect. 3, I include two additional arguments culled from the
literature that support the conclusion that 3rd person must be speciﬁed for person
features, in particular, [ Participant,  Author]. Section 4 contains a discussion of
a formal parallel to this situation: underspeciﬁcation in phonology, and Calabrese’s
(1995) alternative, involving relativization of processes to certain values of features.
Bywayofrevisitingthephenomenathatthe3noPclaimwasoriginallyintendedfor,
Sect.5and6demonstratethepositiveconsequencesofadoptingtherepresentationof
third person as [ Participant,  Author] for an analysis of variation in the typology
of Person-Case effects. Sections 7 and 8 explore further issues in the representation
of person features as they relate to the typology of Person-Case effects. Section 9
concludes the article.
2 Spurious se in Spanish: *me lui meets *le lo
In this section, I demonstrate that the ban on *le lo in Spanish clitic sequences is a
dissimilationrulethatrequiresreferencetoasetoffeaturesexclusivelybornebythird
person.
2.1 Overview
Spanish has a system of pronominal clitics that may be marked for case, person, num-
ber, and gender. These clitics occur in a cluster that is usually immediately preverbal,
except in imperatives and non-ﬁnite forms, in which case it is immediately postverbal.
A partial inventory is given below:
1 Proponents of the 3noP view are often rather keen on attributing it to Emile Benveniste, e.g.:“The
ordinarydeﬁnitionofthepersonalpronounsascontainingthethreetermsI,youandhesimplydestroys
the notion of ‘person’ ” (Benveniste, 1971, p. 219); however, as far as I know, Benveniste was not con-
cerned with the representation of third person as it pertained to concrete syntactic phenomena. My
focus in this article is not on “notions of person” but on the formal representations of and operations
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(1) Partial Clitic inventory:
me: 1st person dat/acc
te: 2nd person dat/acc
lo: 3rd acc masc
la: 3rd acc fem
le: 3rd dat masc/fem
-s: plural on any 3rd person, e.g., los, las, les
Clitic doubling of left-dislocated arguments may occur for both accusative (2) and
dative (3) arguments:
(2) El
the
premio,
prize,
lo
3rd-acc
dieron
gave-pl
a
to
Pedro
Pedro
ayer
yesterday
The prize, they gave to Pedro yesterday.
(3) A
to
Pedro,
Pedro,
le
3rd-dat
dieron
gave-pl
el
the
premio
prize
ayer
yesterday
To Pedro, they gave the prize yesterday.
However, there is an important constraint: 3rd dat and 3rd acc cannot occur together
as clitics, (4). When a dative and an accusative argument require clitic doubling, the
ﬁrst clitic (the dative) undergoes morphological change, resulting in an opaque form
se (an existing clitic used for reﬂexive, reciprocal, impersonal, and a variety of other
constructions). Hence, instead of the expected sequence le lo (4), what results instead
is the sequence se lo (5). This effect has been called “the spurious se” by Perlmutter
(1971), since the repair to the disallowed 3rd–3rd sequence is substitution of a clitic
which otherwise shouldn’t surface, since there is no syntactic context in these ditran-
sitives that otherwise requires it.2
(4) *A
to
Pedro,
Pedro,
el
the
premio,
prize,
le
3rd-dat
lo
3rd-acc
dieron
gave-pl
ayer
yesterday.
(5) A
to
Pedro,
Pedro,
el
the
premio,
prize,
se
se
lo
3rd-acc
dieron
gave-pl
ayer
yesterday.
Though there are a variety of proposals for modeling the structural change of this rule
(e.g., insertion of the “least marked” clitic, feature deletion, etc.), our focus here is
on the structural description of the rule: the triggering environment. We can view this
essentially as a dissimilation rule:
(6) Delete/alter the features corresponding to 3rd person on a dative when it
precedes another 3rd person.
I will defer a full discussion of the features on 3rd person until Sect. 5: they are
[ Participant,  Author]. We may brieﬂy note and dismiss here the possibility of
alternative formulations that do not refer to third person.
(7) “Always delete/alter dative realization in a clitic cluster, except when there is a
participant feature somewhere in the clitic cluster” (alternative proposal to (6)).
2 There are a variety of proposals for why the clitic se is chosen, e.g., because it bears some phonolog-
ical similarity to le, and preserves the clitic status of the original position while only minimally altering
the morphosyntactic contribution. See Bonet (1991) for extensive discussion. I will delay my own
proposal for why se is inserted until Sect. 8, in which the representation of impersonals is discussed.276 A. Nevins
This will not work, because a lone 3rd person dative is ﬁne (see. (3)).
(8) “Always delete/alter dative realization when there is more than one clitic in
a sequence, except when there is a participant feature elsewhere in the clitic
cluster” (alternative proposal to (6)).
This will not work, because when the dative 3rd clitic is second in a cluster (e.g.,
following an impersonal se), nothing happens, as can be veriﬁed by (9):
(9) Se
Imp-cl
les
3rdpl.dat
da
give
los
the
honores
honors
a
to
los
the
generales
generals
(Somebody) gives honors to the generals.
(Perlmutter,1971:33).
We may consider next, then, a slight revision of (8):
(10) “Always delete/alter dative realization when there is more than one clitic in a
sequence and it is the ﬁrst clitic in the sequence, except when there is a partici-
pant feature elsewhere in the clitic cluster” (alternative proposal to (6)).
This works. However, due to the fact that 3rd person clitics always follow 1st person,
2nd person, and impersonal/reﬂexive se clitics, the only time that a 3rd person clitic
will be ﬁrst in a sequence of two or more clitics will be when it precedes an accusative
3rd person clitic, which is precisely the environmentfor the rule in (6). In other words,
the quantiﬁer “always” in the statement in (10) is deceptive, as it makes it look like
this is a general deletion rule of Spanish, subject to the exceptions stated. However,
given all of the exceptions that are needed to make it accurate, (10) becomes nothing
more than a cumbersome restatement of a deletion rule that applies only in the exact
same environment as (6). (10) is thus rephrased as (11):
(11) Delete/alter the features corresponding to 3rd person on a dative when it pre-
cedes another clitic, and there is no participant feature in the clitic it precedes,
i.e. ¬  [Participant] in the second clitic (alternative proposal to (6)).
Incidentally,onecannotrephrase(11)as“leonlyoccurswhenimmediatelypreverbal,
otherwise it is spelled out as se”, because clitic ordering remains the same even in
imperatives and in inﬁnitives, when all clitics are postverbal. Thus, it is not true that
le is immediately adjacent to the verb, either, as (12) and (13) are grammatical.
(12)
! Escapa
Escape.imper
te
2.reﬂ
le!
3.dat
Escape from him!
(13)
! Entrega
Turn-in.imper
te
2.reﬂ
le!
3.dat
Give yourself up to him!
Thus, the negative existential quantiﬁcation in (11) becomes almost equivalent to
saying “Delete when there is a [ Participant] feature in the neighboring clitic”.
However, it is couched as a sort of “licensing statement”, which is somewhat bizarre:
why should a “regular” deletion of 3rd person be “saved” by the presence of
[+Participant] later in the cluster? On the other hand, the dissimilation rule in (6) is
straightforward: the presence of two identical adjacent person feature speciﬁcations
is illicit. The dissimilation rule falls into line with a number of formally identical rulesThe representation of third person 277
in natural language, such as those identiﬁed by the Obligatory Contour Principle
(Leben, 1973), the Double-ing ﬁlter (Ross, 1972), and, most importantly, the set of
cliticconstraintsgivenbyPerlmutter(1971:44)forSpanishthatgenerallybanadjacent
person speciﬁcations in a clitic cluster (recall that dative and accusative are syncretic
for 1st & 2nd person in Spanish, and note that nos is the 1st plural clitic):
(14) *te te, *me me, *nos nos, *me nos, *nos me
Returning to our focus here, the *le lo constraint, we repeat its structural description
below:3
(15) Delete/alter the features corresponding to 3rd person on a dative when it pre-
cedes another 3rd person.
Perlmutter (1971:22) formulates a general set of co-occurrence ﬁlters based on the
prohibition of adjacent 3rd person clitics:4
(16) *le lo, *les lo, *le los, *le la, *le las, *les lo, *les los, *les la,*les las
A reviewer suggests that the dissimilation driving the *le lo constraint is not due to
a ban on adjacent [ Participant,  Author] features, but rather due to a phonological
ban on adjacent stems within a given domain. The idea is that the *le lo constraint and
all of (16) is to be assimilated with *me me and *te te. I ﬁnd this suggestion untenable
for three reasons. First, other Romance languages allow adjacent 3rd person clitics
(e.g., French le lui), while retaining the ban on *me me, *te te; moreover, Spanish disal-
lows *nos me, which do not share phonological stems. Thus, there is little to be gained
byassimilating the*le lo constraint into ageneralconstraint onidentical phonological
stems.
Second,wemayconsider(andreject)averyspeciﬁcversionofthisanalysis,namely
abanonadjacentstemsthatconsistonlyofthesegment“l”.Toinvestigatethishypoth-
esis,Icreatedthenonceverblar,meaning‘tokick’(asmanydialectsofSpanishnotably
lack this verb, and moreover, it is semantically similar to the double-object verb ‘to
give’; see Ramscar (2002), who shows that semantic similarity biases nonce irregular
verb inﬂection). I inﬂected lar entirely parallel to dar ‘to give’, and I trained native
speaker volunteers on sentences such as (17) and (18)
(17) Juan
Juan
me
1sg.dat
lio
lar.3sg
la
the
pelota
ball
Juan larred ( = kicked ) me the ball.
(18) Nunca
Never
te
2sg.dat
loy
lar.1sg
la
the
pelota
ball
Never do I lar ( = kick ) you the ball.
As dar ‘to give’ is analyzable as d + ar, the invented verb lar is analyzable as l + ar,
and, as per the reviewer’s suggestion, le is analyzable as l + e, the prediction of the
3 Manzini (1998) offers the suggestion that the spurious se is triggered by “competition” of two 3rd
person arguments, capturing the same intuition that it is identity of person features that yields the
repair by se.
4 SeealsoGrimshaw(1997),who capturestheintuitionthatthisisalanguage-particulardissimilation
rule driven by the constraint “*XX”. While this constraint is rather coarse-grained in its predictive
scope, if it were to be formulated over abstract morphosyntactic person features, it would go a long
way in explaining clitic cluster restrictions, as we will see in the comparison with Basque below.278 A. Nevins
“No Adjacent L-stem” account is clear here. When I asked subjects how to say “We
kicked him the ball”, they responded as Le lamos la pelota, and not as Se lamos,
thoroughly disproving the role of phonological identity in incurring dissimilation of
the clitic. In short, identity at the level of morphological features, and in particular,
person features, is what is needed to state the *le lo constraint of Spanish.
Finally, I will draw on suggestive comparative evidence from the Arce dialect of
Italian, discussed by Pescarini (2005). Arce shows a phenomenon much like the *le lo
constraint,wheretheﬁrstelementin3dat-3acccombinationglieglieisreplacedbythe
elsewhere locative clitic, yielding ce glie. Importantly, this “spurious ce” occurs in the
3rd.dative-3rd.partitive combination as well, where the expected glie ne also under-
goes replacement of the dative by the elsewhere locative, yielding ce ne.5 The ban on
adjacent 3rd.dative-3rd.partitive clitics cannot be explained by a phonological output
ﬁlter; it clearly requires identity at an abstract level of morphosyntactic features.
At the same time, I would not like to wholly discount the role of phonological
similarity in providing a diachronic nudge for the morphologization of (15), and for
phonological factors quite generally to provide a force in the grammaticalization of
a formal morphological constraint such as (15). For example, consider the fact that
amn’t is an impossible form in many dialects of British and North American English
(Francis, 1985; Bresnan, 2001). This is arguably due to a synchronic ﬁlter banning the
feature combination [+copula, +Pres, +neg, +Auth, +PSE,  singular] on a single
syntactic node, which is resolved in various ways: in the dialect identiﬁed as “Nb 5” in
Francis (1985) as isn’t (i.e., via deletion of [+Auth,+PSE]), while in North American
Englishasaren’t(i.e.viadeletionof[ singular]).Ontheotherhand,thefactthatamn’t
is tolerated in the dialect identiﬁed as “Nb 1” in Francis (1985), and is even attested
in children’s speech (as revealed by a search conducted on CHILDES6) suggests that
there is no active phonological constraint against this form in English; if there were,
it should be rescuable in the phonology, e.g., by epenthesis of a vowel, or by deletion
of one of the two coda nasals (cf. autumn autumnal). Rather, certain dialects have
arguably morphologized a ban on the feature combination [+copula, +Pres, +neg,
+Auth, +PSE,  singular] and respond to this morphosyntactic ﬁlter through various
morphological repairs (e.g., feature deletion). While phonological pressures may play
aroleinshapingthediachronicdevelopmentofpurelymorphologicalﬁlters,theclaim
is that the synchronic representation of the ban on *amn’t and the *le lo constraint is
morphological in nature: a ban on morphological feature co-occurence.
5 Note that as many Romance languages allow clitic sequences such as nos lo, there is little support
for a phonological ban on adjacent homorganic sonorants in a clitic cluster. Moreover, as Italian
distinguishes coronal nasals and laterals from palatal nasals and laterals (with glie as palatal but ne as
coronal), these two clitics cannot even be convincingly argued to share a place of articulation, casting
further doubt on a phonological explanation for the Arce pattern.
6 The following three examples were culled from a search of every child in the database. Notably,
none of their parents uttered amn’t in the database.
a. Mummy I’m doing all it by myself amn’t I? [ belfast/john07.cha:1435; age 4;4.1]
b. I’m doing this puzzle well amn’t I? [macwhin/BOYS/boys67.cha:1464; age 3;11.18]
c. Amn’t I clever? [macwhin/BOYS/boys67.cha:2292; age 3;11.18]The representation of third person 279
In conclusion, the importance of the *le lo constraint for the present discussion is
thatitclearlyrequiresreferenceto3rdperson,andcannotbeformulatedif3rdperson
has no representation in the grammar.
2.2 Support for person-feature dissimilation: the Basque g-/z- constraint
In this subsection, I would like to brieﬂy provide support for the dissimilation analysis
thatIhaveprovided,inwhichthespurioussearisesastheresultofaconstraintagainst
adjacent person feature speciﬁcations. The evidence comes from work by Arregi and
Nevins (2006), who investigate a pattern of unexpected agreement morphology in
dialects of Bizkaian Basque, which they call the g-/z- constraint. These dialects ban
agreement morphology that realizes a 1st-plural argument when a 2nd person argu-
ment is present, and repair the conﬁguration by deleting person features on either
the 1pl or the 2nd person argument. Thus, in contrast to the spurious se constraint,
which bans adjacent identical values of [ Participant], the Basque g-/z- constraint
bans adjacent identical values of [+Participant]. The data to be discussed here come
from de Yrizar (1992).
In the ﬁrst set of phenomena, whenever a 1st person plural dative agreement
morpheme co-occurs with a 2nd person ergative morpheme, the 1st person plural
morpheme is completely deleted. This is shown in (19) for the dialect of Bermeo
Occidental, where the lefthand side of the arrow shows the expected auxiliary form,
while the form on the right of the arrow shows the actual auxiliary that surfaces:
(19) (Hik guri emon)
(You us gave)
d-
3sg.abs-
o-
aux.trans-
sku-
1pl.dat-
na
2sgf.erg
  d-
  3sg.abs-
o-
aux.trans-
na
2sg.erg
You (f.sg) [gave] it to us. (Bermeo Occidental, Yrizar, 1992, vol.1: 486)
The deletion of 1pl in (20) only occurs in the environment of 2nd person ergative.
What is of interest here is that, given the same structural description (e.g., [1pl] and
[2] in the same auxiliary), the dialect of Plencia Nororiental enacts a different repair:
deleting the 2nd ergative instead.
(20) (Suek gu ikusi)
(You us saw)
g-
1pl.abs-
aittu-
aux.trans-
su
2sg.erg
 
 
ga-
1pl.abs-
ittu
aux.trans
You (pl.) [saw] us. (Plencia Nororiental, de Yrizar, 1992, vol.1: 656)
The deletion of 2nd ergative in (10) only occurs in the environment of 1pl. Impor-
tantly, the placement of clitics within the Basque auxiliary is such that the absolutive
clitic appears before the auxiliary root and the ergative appears after the auxiliary
root. Arregi and Nevins (2006), following a tradition in the Basque literature, view
this as a matter of linearization that does not reﬂect hierarchical structure. Therefore,
both the repairs in (19) and (20) are ones which affect a clitic with [+Participant]
in the same cluster as another clitic with a [+Participant] speciﬁcation. We can thus
understand both effects as due to the same structural description:
(21) BannedConﬁguration:[+Participant,+Author+Pl]inthesamecliticclusteras
[+Participant].
The difference between the two dialects is that Bermeo Occidental deletes one of
the offending agreement morphemes ([+Participant, +Author, +Pl]) while Plencia
Nororiental deletes the other ([+Participant]). If we factor out the repairs to (21),280 A. Nevins
we can see that it is also a dissimilation rule, this time based on adjacent identical
values of [+Participant]. The reader is directed to Arregi and Nevins (2006), where
the repair strategies for the g-/z- constraint are presented for ﬁve dialects of Bizkaian
Basque in a variety of argument-structural conﬁgurations.
To recap, the Basque g-/z- constraint is a morphological ban on adjacent identi-
cal values of the person feature [+Participant], demonstrating that dissimilation for
identical person features is a formal conﬁguration that may vary crosslinguistically
in the feature that is targeted. Thus, the analysis of the spurious se constraint as the
result of a dissimilation rule for adjacent values of [ Participant] receives support
from the fact that dissimilation rules for adjacent identical values of person features
are attested elsewhere in natural language.
2.3 Leísmo dialects support the 3rd-person dissimilation analysis
In this subsection, I will address one other alternative analysis for the spurious se con-
dition, which I will show to be untenable. An inspection of (1) reveals that only 3rd
person clitics are contrastive for Case; both 1st and 2nd person clitics have syncretic
forms for Dative and Accusative. Thus, an interesting possible alternative dissimila-
tion rule to (6) would be the following:
(22) Delete/alter the Case (and possibly other) features on a clitic with contrastive
Case-marking when it precedes another clitic with contrastive Case-marking.
The formulation in (22) does not refer to 3rd person at all; it only makes reference
to the facts of Case contrastiveness (see Laenzlinger, 1998:151–156 for an idea along
the lines of (22)).7 However, the problem is that we can ﬁnd dialects of Spanish in
which Case is not contrastive among 3rd person clitics for animate arguments: namely,
the leísmo dialects of Northern Spain. For leístas, sentences such as (23), in which the
clitic le is used to double an accusative argument, are perfectly grammatical.8
(23) Le/*lo
Le/*lo
mataron
killed-3pl
a
a
Pedro
Pedro
They killed Pedro. (Leísta Spanish)
(24) Le/*lo
Le/*lo
vi
saw
a-l
a-the
professor
professor
ayer
yesterday
They saw the professor yesterday. (Leísta Spanish)
Thus, in the words of Franco and Huidobro (2004, p. 219), “Mainstream leísta dialects
involve a neutralization of the Accusative-Dative clitic Case distinction when the ref-
erent is animate”. In addition, these speakers obey the standard speciﬁcity restriction
on clitic doubling of an accusative argument that holds for direct objects in Spanish
(Bleam, 1999). Thus, le cannot double a negatively quantiﬁed direct object, nor can it
double a bare plural.
7 I thank Jim Harris for suggesting exploration of this alternative, and Susana Huidobro for exten-
sive discussion of the leísmo phenomena that I employ in ultimately refuting this possibility. Ivan
Ortega-Santos conﬁrmed the leísta judgements as well.
8 In the glosses below, a, a particle which can be used as either a preposition or a differential object
marker for speciﬁc accusatives, is glossed simply as a.The representation of third person 281
(25) Juan
Juan
no
neg
(*le)
(*3rd)
conoció
met-past.3rd
a
a
nadie
nobody
Juan didn’t meet anyone. (Bleam, 1999: 49)
(26) Juan
Juan
(*les)
(*3rd)
ha
has
conocido
met
a
a
lingüistas
linguists
Juan has met linguists. (Bleam, 1999: 49)
However, for these same speakers, when le is doubling an indirect object, the speci-
ﬁcity restriction does not hold.
(27) Marta
Marta
no
neg
le
3rd
envió
send-past.3rd
su
her
tesis
thesis
a
a
nadie
nobody
Marta didn’t send her thesis to anybody. (Bleam, 1999: 49)
Thus, it seems that the correct conclusion is that leísmo Spanish is identical to Stan-
dard Spanish with respect to the syntax of direct-object clitic doubling. When a direct
object is doubled, it must be speciﬁc, whereas indirect object clitics do not require
speciﬁcity of their doubled argument. Thus, the syntax of clitic doubling in leísmo
Spanish is identical to Standard Spanish; the only difference lies in the morphological
features speciﬁed in the clitics. In (28), I provide a partial list of the Vocabulary Items
of leísmo Spanish:
(28) Leísmo Partial Clitic inventory:
me: 1st person dat/acc
te: 2nd person dat/acc
le: 3rd person dat/acc
lo: 3rd acc [ animate] masc
la: 3rd acc [ animate] fem
-s: plural on any 3rd person, e.g., los, las, les
A brief note is required on the above table. I have suggested that lo is speciﬁed
for [ animate] arguments, while le is underspeciﬁed for animacy. This is because
even in leísmo dialects, le can double an inanimate argument when it is the indirect
object:9
9 A reviewer suggests an alternative, in which leísmo 3rd person clitics do not bear person features.
The only way to implement this suggestion is to assume that lo is speciﬁed as [ animate,+acc] and
that le is underspeciﬁed. Under this possibility, the spurious se rule would be framed as something
like “Replace le with se when it precedes a [ animate] clitic”. The reviewer suggests creating con-
texts with an inanimate, clitic-doubled goal, and an animate theme to arbitrate between possibilities.
Under this analysis, there should be no spurious se with a [ animate] goal and a [+animate] theme; if
anything, this context should yield le le or le los. On the other hand, under my analysis of 3rd-person
dissimilation,thereshouldstillbeaspuriousseeffect.Myleístainformantsjudge(i),inwhichspurious
se has occurred, as exceedingly preferable to (iia) or (iib):
(i) ? El
the-masc.
niño,
child-masc.,
se
SE
lo
3rd-sg
dieron
gave-past.3pl
a-l
a-the
mundo
world
They gave the child to the world.
(ii) a. *El niño, le les dieron a-l mundo
b. *El niño, le los dieron a-l mundo
The noun phrase el mundo ‘the world’ is syntactically animate. As the contrast in (i) and (ii) for leísta
speakers reveals, clitic-left dislocation of el mundo must be accompanied by the [ animate] clitic.282 A. Nevins
(29) Le
3rd
pusé
put-past.1sg
azucar
sugar
a-l
a-the
pastel
cake
‘I put sugar on the cake.’
Thus, it is arguably only lo and la, which are speciﬁed as being both [ animate] and
accusative, that make gender distinctions in leísmo Spanish. Having established the
clitic inventory of leísmo Spanish and demonstrated that dative and accusative are
syncretic for 3rd person [+animate] arguments, it remains to be demonstrated that
leísmo Spanish still shows the spurious se effect. And indeed, it does:
(30) *A
to
Pedro,
Pedro,
el
the
premio,
prize,
le
3rd-dat
lo
3rd-acc
dieron
gave-pl
ayer
yesterday
To Pedro, the prize, they gave yesterday.
(Leísmo Spanish; judgements due to S. Huidobro, I. Ortega-
Santos)
(31) A
to
Pedro,
Pedro,
el
the
premio,
prize,
se
se
lo
3rd-acc
dieron
gave-pl
ayer
yesterday
To Pedro, the prize, they gave yesterday.
(Leísmo Spanish; judgements due to S. Huidobro, I. Ortega-
Santos)
Thus, the Case-contrastiveness hypothesis (repeated below) cannot be maintained, as
speakers for whom le is not contrastively speciﬁed for Case still show the spurious se
effect.10
(32) Delete/alter the Case (and possibly other) features on a clitic with contrastive
Case-marking when it precedes another clitic with contrastive Case-marking.
Instead,theruleforleísmoSpanishseemstobethesameasthatforStandardSpanish,
repeated below.
Footnote 9 continued
(iii) El
The
mundo,
world,
lo
3rd.inanim
/
/
*le
*3rd-anim
ví
saw-1sg
I saw the world
The results in (108)–(109) conﬁrm the fact that it is reference to 3rd person features, and not animacy
(or lack thereof), that is a conditioning environment for the spurious se effect.
10 There is a very interesting side issue to pursue: when both goal and theme are animate in leísmo
Spanish, the theme is realized as lo, yielding a spurious se output of se lo even where se le would be
expected (Landa, 1995: 49). There seems to be an additional dissimilation rule on animacy that affects
the second clitic in such sequences. Independent support for such a rule comes from Ormazabal and
Romero 2006, who note the following contrast for leísmo Spanish:
(i) Te
Cl-2p
lo
Cl-3.inanim
di
gave-1st.
I gave it to you. or ‘I gave him to you.’
(ii) *Te
Cl-2p
le
Cl-3-anim
di
gave-1st.
I gave him to you.
I suggest a context-sensitive feature-deletion rule here: the [+animate] feature on a clitic is deleted
when it follows a [+animate] indirect object clitic. Following Harbour (2003b), the default unmarked
[ animate] feature is re-inserted on the syntactic terminal prior to vocabulary insertion. Thus, even
though in leísmo Spanish, le is the less-speciﬁed vocabulary item, [ animate] still remains the less
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(33) Delete/alter the features corresponding to 3rd person on a dative when it pre-
cedes another 3rd person.
AsthePersonCaseeffectsareoftencalled*meluieffects,andseemtorequirethat3rd
personlacksrepresentationofperson,whilethespuriousseeffectsare,ineffect,abanon
*lelothatrequiresreferenceto3rdperson,Icallthisthe“*meluimeets*lelo”problem.
(Notethatbotheffectscanbefoundinthesamelanguage,asSpanishhasPCCeffects).
Thegeneralquestionthatallproponentsofthe3noPviewmustface,then,isthefollow-
ing:ifthefeaturedeﬁning“3rdperson”isliterallyabsentfromtherepresentation,how
canonestateamorphologicalrulethatcruciallydependsonitspresence?
Here, it may be useful to draw on a quotation by Will Rogers: “Nothing you can’t
spell will ever work.” The conclusion that the spurious se facts inevitably yield is that
3rd person must have a featural representation of Person beyond “nothing”.
3 Further cases requiring reference to 3rd person features
In this section, I will discuss two other phenomena that refer to person features borne
exclusively by third person, and conclude that third person cannot be underspeciﬁed
for person.
3.1 English verbal -s
Consider the distribution of English present tense verbal agreement endings, as sche-
matized in the table below:11
(34)
1st
2nd
3rd
sg
I play 
you play 
he/she plays
pl
we play 
you/y’all play 
they play 
There is massive syncretism in this paradigm: the same form is used for every per-
son/number combination except for 3rd person singular. The intuition here is that the
form /-s/ is listed for use in the 3rd person singular, while the form /- / is the default
present tense agreement ending. An implementation of this intuition in terms of the
mechanisms of Vocabulary Insertion (Halle and Marantz, 1993, Noyer, 1992) and the
Subset Principle (Halle, 1997) would be as follows:
(35) In the environment of Tpres:
/-s/   [ Participant, +Singular]
/- /   elsewhere
Clearly, the most concise and natural representation of the syncretism in (35) is cap-
tured by an intrinsic ordering of the two items in (35), based on speciﬁcation of the
features that each afﬁx realizes. However, without a featural representation for 3rd
person (i.e., if 3rd person is just “the lack of features”), we cannot naturally capture
the fact that when there is a 3rd person singular subject, /-s/ wins over the elsewhere
item because it realizes more features.
11 I am assuming a zero morpheme, as opposed to no ending, for two reasons: one, on the assumption
thattheterminalnodeforagreementalwaysexistsinthesyntaxregardlessofwhetheritisexpressedby
overt phonological material or not, and two, because do-support, understood as driven by the need to
supportatenseafﬁx,stilloccursevenwhentheafﬁxhasnullcontent,asinDo+ theyplay?(Halle,1997).284 A. Nevins
3.2 Menominee sufﬁx distribution
There is one other recent demonstration of the fact that 3rd person must be referred
to by the morphology, due to Trommer (2006). Trommer presents an analysis of
agreement morphology in Menominee. Brieﬂy, there is a set of morphemes in the
independent order (the main paradigm) that are crucially sensitive to whether there
is a 3rd person argument or not. If there is no third person argument, then the mor-
pheme -m is inserted (36):
(36) a.
b.
ke-pose-m,
ne-pose-m,
‘you
‘I
embark’
embark’.
On the other hand, if there is at least one third person argument, then the morpheme
-w is inserted:
(37) a.
b.
c.
pose-w,
ne-nan-ek-w,
ne-nan-a-w,
‘he embarks’
‘he fetches me’
‘I fetch him’.
We can summarizing the pattern as follows:
(38) Menominee Independent Order sufﬁx (descriptive generalization):
All arguments [+Participant]: -m
One argument [+Participant], one argument [ Participant]: -w
Both arguments [ Participant]: -w
As -w occurs in the mixed case of a [+Part] and [ Part] argument, there is no way to
make it the “elsewhere” sufﬁx and avoid speciﬁcation for it. Rather, it looks like -w
is speciﬁed as the sufﬁx if there is a [ Participant] argument, and -m is the elsewhere
sufﬁx(Iamoperatingwithinstandardassumptionshereinholdingthatmorphological
realization has the ability to match features by existential quantiﬁcation, but does not
have access to predicates like “exactly one” instance of a feature).
(39) Menominee Independent Order sufﬁx:
/-w/   [ Participant]
/-m/   elsewhere.
3.3 Implications for a theory of person features
Having empirically established the importance of reference to 3rd person, we return
to its theoretical implications. One of the most recent instantiations of the “3noP”
view within an explicit representational proposal is the geometry of Harley and Ritter
(2002):
Referring-Expression
Participant Individuation
Author Addressee Minimal Group CLASS
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HarleyandRitter’sgeometryhasbeenwidelyadoptedduetotheimportantformaliza-
tion of implicational relations represented by the geometry: that dual number (repre-
sented by activation of both [Minimal] and [Group]) requires the presence of singular
and plural in the number inventory, and that inclusive-we (represented by activation
of both [Author] and [Addressee]) requires the presence of both 1st and 2nd per-
son in the person inventory. These implicational relations and others of Greenberg’s
generalizations (e.g., that gender agreement implies number agreement) are captured
by the structure of the geometry (where downward lines represent dominance rela-
tions which can essentially be traced upwards to form implicational statements). The
geometry is one in which features are privative rather than binary, and hence, there is
no explicit representation of the negative value of a feature. Thus, rather than a rep-
resentation of 3rd person as, say, [ Participant], the geometry encodes this through
literal absence of a Participant node. This representation of featural contrasts follows
the “underspeciﬁcation” approach to the unmarked member of a contrast, which is
widely encountered in the phonological literature (e.g., Archangeli, 1984; Avery and
Rice, 1989).
The representation of two adjacent 3rd persons in this sort of feature geometry
(or in fact, any among the 3noP view, although H&R are the most explicit) is as in
(40). Note that [Referring-Expression] is the feature that roots any pronominal or
agreement node, and hence is not unique to 3rd person—in fact, the representation
below, of two adjacent [Ref-Exp] nodes, will be present in every sequence of adjacent
clitics.
(40) H&R Representation of two adjacent 3rd persons:
[Referring-Expression] [Referring-Expression]
The immediate question that thus arises is, how can one state a dissimilation rule (or
a context-sensitive impoverishment rule) on (40) that will cause feature-alteration of
the ﬁrst clitic only when the second clitic is “3rd person”?12
4 Contrastive visibility: phonological parallels
In this section, I review a formally identical problem in another domain of the gram-
mar: phonology. The problem of having to refer to seemingly underspeciﬁed values
has reared its head before in the study of phonological representations. Much like
in syntax, underspeciﬁcation was pursued as an attempt to “make invisible” or ren-
der deﬁcient those objects which behaved differently (Archangeli, 1984). However,
immediate problems arose. Consider the plight of coronal underspeciﬁcation: many
researchers attempted to treat coronals as underspeciﬁed for place, due to their trans-
parency in assimilation phenomena. However, Mohanan (1991), McCarthy and Taub
(1992) and Steriade (1995) pointed out a number of problems for underspeciﬁca-
tion in phonology, exactly parallel to the dilemma above: while underspeciﬁcation
made a feature F invisible for process X, it turns out that feature F is required to
state the environment for some other process Y. The solution to this problem came
with Calabrese (1995), who proposed that it is not F which is underspeciﬁed, but X
12 A secondary issue which arises in this representational system is the question of how to distinguish
3rd person from reﬂexives and impersonals. I return to this issue with a proposal and some suggestive
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and Y which are relativized in their domain of visibility. More speciﬁcally, Calabrese
proposed that rules may be parametrized to include reference to all values, only
contrastive values, or only marked values. Calabrese’s idea is that the invisibility
of non-contrastive values on certain segments is part of the conditions of a particular
rule, but not part of the inherent representation of those segments, since other rules may
in fact have to refer to the presence of those values. Let us consider a case study, based
on the behavior of Finnish vowels. Finnish has the inventory in (41), for both short
and long vowels.
(41) Finnish inventory
[-back,-rd]
i
e
ä
[-back, +rd]
ü
ö
[+back, +rd]
u
o
[+back, rd]
a
[+high,  low]
[ high,  low]
[ high, +low]
Finnish is famous for its vowel harmony, whereby sufﬁxes must agree in [± back]
with the root vowels (see, e.g., Ringen, 1975). However, a well-known exception is
the transparency of [ low, back, round] vowels in harmony. Thus, in a word such as
koti-na ‘home-essive’, the essive sufﬁx takes the [+back] form -na (rather than -nä),
because of the [+back] root vowel o in the ﬁrst syllable of the root. The high front
vowel i is ignored for the purposes of computing the harmonic value of the sufﬁx.
Based on (41), some researchers have proposed that /i/ is underspeciﬁed for [back]
throughout the phonology, hence literally invisible at the point at which harmony
applies. This solution achieves the goal of making all harmony essentially local, as
the representation by hypothesis does not contain a [ back] value for i until after
harmony is computed.
Aproblemiscausedbydepriving/i/ofits[ back]feature,however:thewell-known
ruleofFinnishassibilation(Kiparsky,1973)turnsacoronalstopintoafricativebefore
i, as shown in (42). (This rule is subject to further conditions, as discussed extensively
by Anttila (2003), who points out the important role of metrical conditioning.)
(42) a. t   s / _ [ round, back,+high]
b. /tilat-i/ ‘order-past’   [tilasi]
It is difﬁcult to make a case that assibilation occurs after vowel harmony; thus, judi-
cious ordering of [ high] ﬁll-in after harmony but before assibilation enjoys little
support (and no generality as a solution to the problem of underspeciﬁcation; see
Steriade (1995) on other problems with ordering “ﬁll-in” rules). The process in (42)
can be understood as having a phonological basis in the fact that [+high,  back]
vowels often cause palatalization and lenition of obstruents, in particular, t to s, with
president presidencyasawell-knownexampleofspirantizationinEnglish(Chomsky
and Halle, 1968: 161), in addition to a host of other crosslinguistic examples, e.g., aff-
rication of coronal stops before high front vowels in Brazilian Portuguese (Cagliari,
1997). In fact, Hall and Hamann (2006) characterize the high, front quality of /i/ as
aerodynamically crucial in causing assibilation. However, if Finnish /i/ literally lacks
[ back], assibilation cannot be characterized in these terms, because the conditioning
feature is (by hypothesis) literally absent from the representation. Thus, while depriv-
ing /i/ of [ back] does work in making it invisible for harmony, such a representation
leaves it puzzling why that same vowel should trigger assibilation. The proper solu-
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but different processes (e.g., harmony) are sensitive to what values of a feature will
participate in the process. In this case, as /i/ is non-contrastive for the feature [back]
(since there is no other [+high, round] vowel in the inventory to distinguish it from
by backness), one can understand Finnish sufﬁxal harmonic alternations as restricted
to conditioning by contrastive values of [back];13 see Nevins (2004) for an application
of this proposal to Finnish, based on Calabrese’s original (1995) proposal that, given
full speciﬁcation of segments, syntagmatic processes may still be restricted/relativized
in their access to certain values of a feature.
A similar case in which underspeciﬁcation of a feature for one process leads to
analytic problems in understanding a separate process which relies on that feature
can be found in relation to “coronal underspeciﬁcation” in English. Coronal under-
speciﬁcation was proposed to account for phenomena such as postlexical assimilation
(e.g., hot cakes   hock kakes). But coronals must be referred to in early levels
of phonology, to rule out e.g., *tl sequences, and to state a constraint on ju nuc-
lei in stressed syllables in American English (e.g., butte, mute, cute, ’tute, tune  
[bjut, mjut, kjut, *tjut,*tjun]). Thus, whatever the correct understanding is of why
coronals allow postlexical place assimilation, it is not to be found in depriving them
of the feature [coronal] in their representation: this creates an ordering paradox.
A possible solution within Calabrese’s parametrized approach to feature values is
that postlexical assimilation cannot alter marked values of [±coronal] (by hypothesis,
negative values of [coronal]), whereas morpheme structure constraints refer to all
values of [coronal].
Thus, the *le lo meets me lui problem is, in some sense, familiar from other areas
of the grammar: while it is tempting to underspecify a given grammatical object, e.g.,
3rd person, in explaining its apparent exclusion from person agreement in Person
Case conﬁgurations, it is nonetheless needed to condition a dissimilation rule in mor-
phology. The proposed solution for 3rd person then, is to adopt Calabrese’s model
of parametrized visibility for person features in the syntax. One immediate conse-
quence, however, of adopting this model is that person and number features must
be binary (contra Harley and Ritter, 2002; see Trommer, 2006 for a similar conclu-
sion), given any formulation of a deﬁnition of contrastiveness in a system without
underspeciﬁcation.
5 Person features, representations, and deﬁnitions
In this section, we move towards an alternative to the 3noP view that will still allow
forasyntacticandmorphologicaldistinctionbetween1st/2ndpersonontheonehand,
and 3rd on the other. We discuss the binary features that compose person categories,
and introduce the notion of relativization to all, marked, or contrastive values of
these features. We will then set up the conditions on the operation Multiple Agree,
13 An interesting cognitive parallel arises in Sedivy, Tanenhaus, Chambers, and Carlson (1999) who
made use of the real-time eye-tracking paradigm in an experiment with spoken language and visual
contexts. Given a scene with a pink comb, a yellow comb, and a yellow bowl, subjects were given
instructions such as Pick up the yellow comb. Sedivy et al. found that at the onset of the word yellow,
subjects looked much faster and more frequently at the yellow comb, even before they had heard the
head noun. The only logical explanation is that subjects understood that, given spoken instructions,
their interlocutor would be more inclined to use the predicate yellow when it was contrastive for the
object to be manipulated. That is, even though the predicate yellow was true of both the comb and
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governing the realization of clitic sequences, that will be crucial in re-examining the
typology of PCC effects once third person has a featural speciﬁcation.
5.1 Person representations
Given the binary feature [±Participant], where a positive value denotes that the
referring expression contains one of the discourse participants, and the binary feature
[±Author], where a positive value denotes that the referring expression contains the
author, person features will be represented as follows (I adopt these features from
Halle (1997)):
(43) [ F] = ¬[+F]
a. [+Auth] = the reference set contains the speaker
b. [+Participant] = the reference set contains one of the discourse participants.
(44) a. [+Auth,+Part] = 1st person
b. [ Auth,+Part] = 2nd person
c. [ Auth,  Part] = 3rd person
d. [+Auth,  Part] = logically impossible.
These featural assignments represent the possibilities for natural language.
[±Participant] has been amply justiﬁed in the literature (Forchheimer, 1953:6); as
an example, Harley and Ritter demonstrate that it expresses the fact that Maltese and
Lyélé do not show gender distinctions in [+Participant]. The Basque g-/z- constraint
discussed above makes crucial reference to [+Participant] as well. In Sect. 7, I discuss
the use of [±Author] in comparison to a putative feature [± Hearer].
However, not all languages have identical pronoun inventories. For languages that
express a distinction between inclusive and exclusive 1st person (where inclusive
means that the addressee is included and exclusive means that the addressee is not), I
propose, following McGinnis (2005), that a language can add an additional speciﬁca-
tion: the unary feature [addressee].14 Crucially, this feature need not be present in all
pronominal/agreement inventories, as extensively argued by McGinnis; its presence
on a [+Auth,+Part] feature-set, however, serves to indicate inclusive-“we”.15 This
feature will not interact in any of the PCC systems to be discussed. We return to this
issue in Sect. 7.2.
One of the consequences of adopting [±Auth] is the fact that the presence of
[ Auth] within 3rd person may play an active role in the grammar (e.g., when syn-
cretisms arise between 2nd and 3rd person); hence I maintain here that the feature
is always speciﬁed. When there is always full speciﬁcation for binary features, as I
am adopting here, there is an important distinction to establish: one that I will argue
becomes relevant for certain aspects of the syntactic computation. It is whether or not
a particular feature is contrastive within a given set of other features.
14 Arguments for a theory of number features in which most features are binary but additional
subdistinctions are accomplished by a unary feature can be found in Harbour (2003a).
15 Although logically redundant, unary [addressee] may be added to a [ Auth,+Part] feature set,
yielding a featural basis for syncretism effects found in many Algonquian languages and in Kiowa,
Acehnese,andDiola-Fognyinwhich(semi-)identicalformsexpressbothinclusive-1pland2ndperson,
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(45) A pronoun S with speciﬁcation  F is contrastive for F if there is another pro-
noun S’ in the inventory that is featurally identical to S, except that it is   F.
Or, alternatively (and equivalently):16
(46) An instance of the feature F is contrastive within a set of other features S if
both values of F may occur in S.
Thenotionofcontrastivenessisparadigmaticallybased(i.e.onstaticpropertiesofthe
inventory), but what is interesting about its application here is that it will be directly
used in syntagmatic conﬁgurations (i.e. where more than one person feature interacts
in a structured representation).
One of the direct consequences of this deﬁnition is that [±Auth] is not contrastive
within the feature bundle [ Part, Auth] (since there is no pronoun speciﬁed [ Part,
+Auth]). That is to say, [±Auth] is not contrastive when it co-occurs with [ Part].
On the other hand, [±Auth] is contrastive when it co-occurs with [+Part], since both
values [+Auth] and [ Auth] can occur in the presence of [+Part].
It should be mentioned here that whether or not a phi-feature like [±Auth] is con-
trastiveornotrepresentsadeparturefromcommonpracticeinfeature-drivenmodels
ofagreement(e.g.,Chomsky,2001).Infact,itmayappearthatwhetheragivenfeature
is contrastive or not looks like a “feature of a feature” or a “meta-feature”. I would
argue that it is true that contrastiveness is a property of a given feature within the
context of other features with which it co-occurs. Clearly, reference to such a property
represents an addition to the standard minimalist assumptions about features. The
question is whether the empirical coverage it affords justiﬁes its addition to syntactic
theory, which is what I hope to convince the reader of.
It should also be noted that by adopting a binary-valued (as opposed to privative)
feature system, markedness is not read off by structural complexity. For each binary
feature, it must be indicated which value of the feature is the marked one. There are a
variety of diagnostics for what makes a given value of a feature marked. One of these
is that syncretisms for other features tend to occur more in the marked category;
for example, as noted by Noyer (1992), gender features are often impoverished in
the context of [+Auth] but not [ Auth], e.g., in Semitic; similarly, for Germanic and
Romance,genderfeaturesareimpoverishedinthecontextof[+Part]butnot[ Part].
Another source of evidence comes from conjoined noun phrases in which each con-
junct contains a different binary value; in these cases, verbal agreement for person is
inevitably with the marked category, e.g., when “he” and “I” are conjoined, the result
is [+Auth] agreement on the verb. For the person features we are considering here,
the following markedness statements hold:
(47) a. + is the marked value of [Part]
b. + is the marked value of [Auth]
5.2 Value-relativized parametrization
Thekeyideatobeadoptedhereisthatcertainsyntagmaticprocessesmayberestricted
in their access to all values of a given feature. Calabrese’s proposal for phonologi-
cal processes such as vowel harmony, which across languages seem to have differing
16 Note that both of these formulations depart from Calabrese’s deﬁnition, which is stated in terms
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locality conditions and to involve different sets of participating segments, was that
the core grammatical principle was the same, but that the search for a feature may be
restricted to, for example, only contrastive values of a feature:
(48) For a feature F, a search may be relativized to a domain which includes all
values of F, only the contrastive values of F, or only the marked values of F.
This parametric variation in which values of a feature are included in a search turns
out to be very useful in understanding microvariation between languages that have
the same inventories, but different items that participate in a given grammatical pro-
cess. Within this paper, I will extend the general approach to cases of microvariation
within Person-Case effects in clitic clusters.
5.3 Conditions on Multiple Agree
The general approach that I will take to person-case effects is that they arise when
both pronouns/clitics are within the same agreement domain. I will adopt the insight
of Anagnostopoulou (2005), Bejar and Rezac (2003), and Adger and Harbour (2006)
that the PCC is a result of two DPs within the domain of a single probing head. Thus,
within the framework for agreement proposed in Chomsky (2001) and subsequently
reﬁned by Hiraiwa (2001, 2004), (Multiple) Agree is a featural relation between a
Probe and a set of one or more Goals.
I have chosen to implement the analysis here in terms of Multiple Agree by a
single head, rather than in terms of a general condition on person in terms of case
hierarchies or grammatical function, because the PCC only arises in the ditransitive
domain, between indirect and direct object, and not between, say, subject and object.
Thus, while the PCC banning a 3rd dative above a 1/2 accusative when both are clitics
holds throughout Italian dialects, there are dialects in which the PCC holds between
IO and DO clitics but not between subject and object clitics. Such a case is cited
by Bianchi (2005), based on a personal communication from Cecilia Poletto on the
Northern Italian dialect of Loreo (Rovigo), which has subject clitics, but nonetheless
allows a 3-1 combination of subject-object clitics:
(49) Lu
He
el
3sg.subj-cl
me
1sg.obj-cl
ga
has-3sg
invidá
invited
He has invited me. (Loreo; Bianchi, 2005:8)
In no version of Agree-based syntactic theory do subject and object occupy the same
domain at the point of the relevant Agree operations,17 so if PCC effects are modeled
in terms of Multiple Agree, it is unsurprising that no PCC effects will hold between
subject and object clitics. There is robust evidence, on the other hand, that indirect
and direct object constitute two arguments within the same domain. For example,
Bruening (2001) argues that scope-freezing in ditransitive constructions is due to a
Tucking-In condition on QR as both of these arguments must target the same head.
The reader is referred to Anagnostopoulou (2003) for an extensive discussion of the
syntax of ditransitive constructions in which IO and DO constitute arguments in the
same domain.
In adopting Multiple Agree, then, I am assuming that the relevant probe is v, or
perhaps a complex head formed by v and an Applicative head that mediates ditransi-
tive argument structure. In the subsequent discussion, then, when I refer to the Probe
17 I assume that movement operations such as object shift are ordered after the relevant Agree
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speciﬁed to Multiple Agree with arguments in its domain, I am referring to v. The
result of this Multiple Agree operation will be the clitics that are realized in conjunc-
tion with the verb. Following Borer (1984), I will assume that clitics are the direct
spell-out of agreement between a verb and its argument(s). Under this view, (il)licit
clitic combinations provide a direct window onto the Agree mechanisms occurring
between v and the arguments within its domain.
The following two conditions on Multiple Agree will be crucial to the account.
These are inspired by Anagnostopoulou (2005) and Hiraiwa (2001, 2004), but for-
malized differently here. The ﬁrst pertains to locality within an agreement domain:
once the visibility parameter is set for a given domain, the highest argument within
that domain must fall within the scope of that visibility parametrization. The second
pertainstofeaturalidentityforelementswithinthatdomain:theymustmatchinvalue
with each other. Both of these conditions are crucial to the present understanding of
the PCC.
(50) Contiguous Agree: For a relativization R of a feature F on a Probe P, and x  
Domain(R(F)),
¬ y, such that y>x and P>y and y /   Domain(R(F))
“There can be no interveners between P and x that are not in the domain of
relativization that includes x”.
(51) Matched Values: For a relativization R of a feature F,    ,     {+, },
  x, x   Domain(R(F)), val(x,F) =  
“All elements within the domain of relativization must contain the same value
for the feature F being agreed with”.
These conditions are inviolable and not ranked; they must be met in every language.
Although Multiple Agree was proposed as a dynamic operation in a derivational
syntax, it is important to point out that these two conditions are compatible with
a representational set of conditions on agreement. If they are to be understood as
derivational constraints on the single operation of Multiple Agree, it is important
that Agreement with the two goals exists simultaneously, as originally formulated in
Hiraiwa’s proposal.18
18 A reviewer suggests that these conditions on a simultaneous agreement operation might instead
be replaced by a sequence of two distinct Agree operations. The reviewer proposes, for example, that
the Strong PCC ban on a [+Participant] indirect object above a [+Participant] direct object results
fromaninterventioneffectduring anattemptatAgreewiththedirect object.Ineffect,vProbesdown
and ﬁnds the indirect object, without a problem. Then, a second, distinct Agree applies, in which v
seeks to agree with the direct object. However, the c-commanding indirect object intervenes, thereby
blocking Second-Agree between v and the direct object.
This is a fascinating suggestion, but it must ultimately be rejected. First, it would require a radical
reanalysisofmanyotherphenomena,suchasmultiplewh-questions.Essentially,thesuggestionisthat
the Strong PCC arises from the fact that the ﬁrst argument blocks Agree with the second argument.
In other words, the suggestion is that there is no Multiple Agree in the Parallel/Simultaneous sense,
there is only Agree, which may probe more than once (henceforth, First-Agree and Second-Agree).
Note that the mechanics of this suggestion will rule out any case of Multiple-Wh where the two whs
are in situ, for the exact same reason that its mechanics are intended to rule out multiple goals with
[+Participant]. Moreover, Rackowski and Richards (2005) present extensive evidence from Tagalog
that a mechanism of Second-Agree is not blocked by the goal that underwent First-Agree.
The existence of Multiple Wh-movement thus presents an immediate problem for the idea that
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6 Varieties of PCC
In this section I explore a variety of person-case effects that have been investigated
throughout the literature. Bonet (1991) and Anagnostopoulou (2005) discuss the
“weak” and “strong” versions of the PCC, which involve different constraints on
licit clitic combinations.19 I will differ in my analytic approach here, however, in that
the crucial aim is to adopt the same syntactic mechanism (namely, the conditions on
Multiple Agree in (50) and (51)) in understanding both the weak and strong PCC, as
well as the Me-First PCC (which will be introduced below):
(52) Desideratum:AllversionsofthePCCshouldbeexplainedbythesamesyntactic
mechanism, differing only in relativization to which (values of which) features
must obey the constraint.
Footnote 18 continued
One possibility in order to rule out PCC effects but correctly allow Multiple Wh-phrases would
be that the “Second-Agree only converges if the First Goal moves” hypothesis is only relevant for
A-type agreement. The most promising place to look for relevant evidence would be in Icelandic
Dat-Nom constructions. Note that on the Multiple-Agree account that I have developed in this paper
(with the Matched-Value constraint), the contrast between the single question-mark of (i) and the
double question-mark of (ii) (15b & 16b in Holmberg and Hróarsdóttir (2004)) can be understood:
(i) ?Hva a
Which
studentum
student-PL
ﬁnnast
ﬁnds-PL
tölvurnar
computers-PL
ljótar
ugly
Which students ﬁnd the computers ugly?
(ii) ??Hva a
Which
student
student-SG
ﬁnnast
ﬁnds-PL
tölvurnar
computers-PL
ljótar
ugly
Which student ﬁnds the computers ugly?
In the Multiple-Agree with Matched-Values framework, of course (i) should be better than (ii), since
both Goals are Plural, whereas (ii) should be bad, because one Goal is singular, while the other is
Plural. The reviewer’s “Second-Agree only converges if the First Goal moves” hypothesis cannot
explain these data, since the First Goal indeed has moved (undergoing wh-movement), and since the
alternative developed in the review explicitly rejects the Matched-Value constraint. (Note that this
only matters if we want to cover the contrast between one and two question marks for the conﬁgura-
tions in Holmberg and Hróarsdóttir (2004)).
An additional area in which we might look for relevant data is the Multiple-Nominative construc-
tions in Japanese. Miyagawa (2001) reports that in a Multiple Nominative construction, interestingly
enough, both DPs seem to need to move. This holds true even in OSV orders, where the scope of the
subject outside negation can be taken to show that the subject DP has also moved overtly:
(i) siken-ga
exam-nom
zen’iin-ga
all-nom
uke-rare-nakatta
take-able-neg-pst
The exam, all could not take it. (  > ¬) (S. Miyagawa. pers. comm. November 2005)
ThefactthatbothDPsmustmoveinaMultiple-NomconstructionwouldmakesenseunderaMultiple-
Agreetypeview:ifbothDPsareagreedwithsimultaneously,thenanEPP-tied-toAgreedrivingovert
movement would presumably only have the option of moving both. In the reviewer’s implementation,
there is no way to enforce this.
To conclude, there are three lines of data (Multiple-Wh, Icelandic Dat-Nom constructions,
Multiple-Nom) that introduce complications for the reviewer’s suggestion that syntax includes an
option of “Double-Agree”. I have chosen to formalize the analysis within Multiple Agree in the text,
as that model has been applied to a number of other syntactic phenomena and does not encounter
the above empirical difﬁculties.
19 There are other researchers who have worked on the PCC, often restricting their attention to the
weakPCC,wherethe3noPviewisemployedintheimplementation;clearlythe3noPview,inaddition
to its empirical shortcomings described here, is of little avail in understanding strong and Me-First
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The ﬁrst constraint to be examined is the “me lui” version, so named because, in
French, it amounts to a prohibition on the clitic sequence me lui (1-acc 3-dat), where
it is assumed that these clitics double an underlying argument structure where the
indirect object c-commands the direct object. This is also called the “Weak PCC”. It
effectively bans conﬁgurations of the form: *3 1 and *3 2, where linear order here
reﬂectsunderlyingdominancerelations.Inotherwords,a[ Participant]dativecannot
dominate a [+Participant] accusativewithin the samedomain.Considerthe following
examples from Catalan:
(53) *A
to
en
the
Josep,
Josep,
me
1st-acc
li
3rd-dat
va recomenar
recommended
la
the
Mireia
Mireia
She (Mireia) recommended me to him (Josep).
(Catalan; Bonet, 1991:178)
(54) *A
to
en
the
Josep,
Josep,
te
2nd-acc
li
3rd-dat
va recomenar
recommended
la
the
Mireia
Mireia
She (Mireia) recommended you to him (Josep).
(Catalan; Bonet, 1991:179)
(55) En
the
Josep,
Joseph,
te
2nd-dat
’l
3rd-acc
va recomenar
recommended
la
the
Mireia
Mireia
She (Mireia) recommended him (Josep) to you.
(Catalan; Bonet, 1991:179)
Incidentally, the contrast in (53)-(54) cannot be handled by claiming that 3rd person
is not a person, for reasons internal to Catalan. Bonet (1991: 209) points out that (53)
is grammatical when the dative clitic is replaced by the locative clitic:
(56) A
to
en
the
Pere,
Pere,
m’hi
1st.acc+loc.
va recomenar
recommended
la
the
Mireia
Mireia
Mireia recommended me to him (Pere).
(Catalan; Bonet, 1991:209)
Interestingly, such a strategy can only be pursued in clitic left-dislocation environ-
ments, and cannot rescue a clitic-doubling structure:
(57) *M’hi
1st.acc+loc
ha
introduced
presentat a
to
la
the
Maria
Maria
S/he has introduced me to Maria.
(Catalan; Bonet, 1991:212)
This strongly suggests a syntactic analysis in which the locative hi can be generated
to resume a left-dislocated goal, under a “feature compatibility” requirement for
coindexation (Bonet, 1991:213). If this account is on the right track, it shows that a
locative clitic does not participate at all in Multiple Agree (similarly to the invisibility
of prepositional phrases to the phi-feature system). This contrast between locative
hi and 3rd-person li is further suggestive of the fact that 3rd-person must have a
representation that is distinct from “no person”.20
Next, we examine the “Strong PCC”, which bans all of the conﬁgurations of the
weak PCC above, as well as additionally excluding conﬁgurations in which there are
two [+Participant] arguments in the same domain that bear different values for the
20 Eulàlia Bonet brought this argument to my attention.294 A. Nevins
feature[Author].Inotherwords,inadditiontothebanon*32and*31fromtheweak
PCC, in the strong PCC, the additional excluded person-case combinations are: *1 2
and *2 1 within the same domain, where linear order reﬂects underlying dominance
relations.
(58) *O
the
Kostas
Kostas
mu
1st-dat
se
2nd-acc
sístise
introduced
Kostas introduced you to me. (Greek; Bonet, 1991: 178)
(59) *O
the
Kostas
Kostas
su
2nd-dat
me
1-acc
sístise
introduced
Kostas introduced me to you. (Greek; Bonet, 1991: 178)
Finally, we turn to the Me-First PCC, which is intermediate in restrictiveness between
the weak and strong PCC, and less widely encountered than either. This version of
the PCC disallows conﬁgurations in which a [ Auth] argument dominates a [+Auth]
argument; in other words, if there is a ﬁrst person argument, it must be ﬁrst in the
domain (hence the name “Me-First”). However, unlike the strong PCC, the Me-First
PCC admits conﬁgurations of the form 1 2. Summarizing, the Me-First PCC speciﬁ-
cally excludes person-case combinations of the form *2 1 (as well as * 3 1), where
linear order reﬂects underlying dominance relations.
(60) *Me
1-reﬂ
te
2-dat
escapé
escaped-1.pst
I escaped from you.
(Spanish (some speakers); Perlmutter, 1971:26)
(61) Te
2-reﬂ
me
1-dat
escapaste
escaped-2.pst
You escaped from me.
(Spanish (some speakers); Perlmutter, 1971:25)
Some versions of the Me-First PCC only disallow *3 1 and *2 1, while allowing 3 > 2;
see for example the discussion of Romanian below. Other versions additionally ban
weak PCC conﬁgurations, in which a [ Part] argument may not dominate a [+Part]
argument; see the discussion of Classical Arabic below, and Spanish for the above
speakers (see Fernández-Soriano, 1999, p. 1927).
Turning to a syntactic account of these PCC effects, I will adopt Anagnostopou-
lou’s (2005) idea that the strong and weak (and, I claim, the Me-First) PCC all arise
in the same conﬁguration: when two weak DPs are in the domain of the same head.
An interesting challenge here is to understand and explain how there can be so
much microvariation reported for dialects of Spanish/Catalan; in the words of Bonet
(1991:179):“Thejudgmentsconcerningcombinationsofﬁrstandsecondpersonclitics
vary considerably from speaker to speaker.” Ideally, this microvariation is best
understood in terms of a very small microparameter on the head that facilitates
such conﬁgurations (and not in terms of the way “1st person” is represented in the
language as a whole).
The crucial idea that I will adopt here is that the locus of variation is in the search
domain as set by the Probing head in charge of agreement within this domain (the
proposal here is consistent with this head being identiﬁed either as v or Appl, and no
commitment is made here). I will thus adopt an idea that is inspired by Bejar (2003):
variation in the agreement “preferences” of a given multi-argument conﬁguration are
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Thus, rather than viewing PCC effects as arising from the nature of the represen-
tations speciﬁed on arguments (e.g., “3rd person datives have no person feature in
Spanish”), what I will pursue here is the idea that the variation and “strength” of PCC
depends on how many values are excluded by the relativization domain as set on the
agreeing head that controls the domain.
Once the parametric choice of value-relativization of the domain is chosen, the
conditions on an Extended Agree domain (with no interruptions/interveners in the
domain) and on Matched Values (with agreeing values for the chosen feature) must
be met. They are repeated below.
(62) Contiguous Agree (CA): For a relativization R of a feature F on a Probe P, and
x   Domain(R(F)),
¬ y, such that y >x and p>y and y /   Domain(R(F))
“There can be no interveners between P and x that are not in the domain of relativ-
ization that includes x”
(63) Matched Values (MV): For a relativization R of a feature F,    ,     {+, },
  x, x   Domain(R(F)), val(x,F) =  
“Allelementswithinthedomainofrelativizationmustcontainthesamevalue”.
Let us proceed to see how varying relativizations of the search domain will yield the
varieties of the PCC.
6.1 Deriving the weak PCC
In the ﬁrst scenario to consider, the search has been relativized to the marked values
of [Participant], i.e., positive values, as in (47). For a convergent derivation to occur,
therefore, the following condition must be met (CA): there cannot be any unmarked
valuesof[Participant]thatintervenebetweentheProbeandelementswiththefeatur-
al speciﬁcations it is looking for. Note that the second condition, MV, is trivially met
when there is marked relativization to a single value of a binary feature (i.e., in this
case),astherecannotbeelementswithinthisdomainthathavedifferingvaluesforthe
feature in question. The possibilities for clitic ordering (with left-to-right indicating
dominance, i.e. dative on the left and accusative on the right) are given below, and, in
each case, an ‘x’ indicates that the conﬁguration fails to meet a condition on Multiple
Agree.21 Checkmarks ( ) will be used in the table to indicate convergent derivations.
(64) Weak PCC: If Acc is 1/2, then Dat is 1/2.
Probe’s Value-Relativization: Marked [Part].
CA MV
  1 3
  1 2
  2 1
  2 3
3 1 x
3 2 x
21 This is purely for presentational purposes; readers who see an afﬁnity with optimality-theoretic
tableaus are reminded that these conditions are inviolable and unranked.296 A. Nevins
To summarize the intuition behind the weak PCC within the current syntactic imple-
mentation: the Probe is searching for Marked values of Participant. Conﬁgurations
such as <3 1> and <3 2> constitute violations of the Contiguous Agree domain,
because a non-marked value of [Participant] interrupts the Agreement span. Inde-
pendent of the particular implementation in terms of Multiple Agree given here, the
general logic behind the claim is that given the feature [Participant], a marked value
of this feature cannot be only on the lower argument within the domain of the vP.
6.2 Deriving the strong PCC
We turning now to the strong PCC, deriving this constraint from the same principles
as the weak PCC above, with the difference only in the relativization of feature-
values on the Probe. The strong PCC results from a Probe that is speciﬁcally looking
for contrastive values of [Author]. Recall from the deﬁnition of contrastiveness given
in (45) that [Author] is not contrastive in the context of [ Part], i.e., in 3rd persons.
Given this relativization on the Probe, the condition on Continuous Agree will be
contravened when a non-contrastive value of [Auth] intervenes in the agreement
span, i.e., when a 3rd person dominates a 1st or 2nd person in the domain. Moreover,
given this relativization, as Multiple Agree can potentially apply within combinations
of 1st and 2nd person, the condition on Matched Values for Multiple Agree will
lead to an illicit derivation when there are conﬂicting contrastive values for [Auth],
i.e., [+Part,+Auth] and [+Part, Auth]. The possibilities for clitic ordering (with left-
to-right indicating dominance, i.e. dative on the left and accusative on the right) are
given below.
(65) Strong PCC: Acc must be 3rd.
Relativization: Contrastive [Auth]
CA MV
  1 3
1 2 x
2 1 x
  2 3
3 1 x
3 2 x
Summarizing the strong PCC intuition, since the Probe is searching for contrastive
values of [Auth], conﬁgurations such as <3 1> and <3 2> constitute violations of the
Contiguous Agree domain, because a non-contrastive value of [Auth] interrupts the
Agreement span, while conﬁgurations of 1 and 2 constitute violations of the Matched
Value condition. Independent of the particular implementation in terms of Multiple
Agree given here, the general logic behind the analysis of the Strong PCC here is that
given contrastive values of [Author], there cannot be distinct values of this feature
within the domain of the vP.
6.3 Deriving the Me-First PCC
Finally, we turn what I have identiﬁed as the Me-First PCC, which has received little
analytical attention in the literature. The constraint is that if Dat is 2/3, Acc cannot be
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with marked values of [Author], which are the positive values according to 5.1. For a
convergent derivation to occur, therefore, the following condition must be met (CA):
there cannot be any unmarked values of [Author] that intervene between the Probe
and elements within the featural speciﬁcations it is looking for. Note that the second
condition, MV, is trivially met when there is marked relativization to a single value of
a binary feature (i.e., in this case), as there cannot be elements within this domain that
have differing values for the feature in question. The possibilities for clitic ordering
(with left-to-right indicating dominance, i.e., dative on the left and accusative on the
right) are given below.
(66) Me-First PCC. Relativization: Marked [Auth].
CA MV
  1 3
  1 2
2 1 x
  2 3
3 1 x
  3 2
TosummarizetheMe-FirstPCCintuition,theProbeissearchingformarkedvaluesof
Auth.Conﬁgurationssuchas<31>and<21>constituteviolationsoftheContiguous
Agreedomain,becauseanon-markedvalueof[Auth]interruptstheAgreementspan.
Independent of the particular implementation in terms of Multiple Agree given here,
the general logic behind the claim is that given the feature [Auth], a marked value of
this feature cannot be only on the lower argument within the domain of the vP.
There is an important note to add here. The relativization to marked [Auth] does
notruleouttheconﬁguration<32>,sincebothoftheseare[ Auth].Thisisawelcome
result, as <3 2> is allowed in Romanian (Ciucivara, 2004, Farkas and Kazazis, 1980):
(67) Maria
Maria
i-
3-dat
te-
2-acc
a
has
prezentat
introduced
Mariam has introduced you to herz.
(68) Maria
Maria
me-
1-dat
te-
2-acc
a
has
prezentat
introduced
Maria has introduced you to me.
(69) *Maria
Maria
i-
3-dat
m-
1-acc
a
has
prezentat
introduced
Mariam has introduced me to herz.
(70) *Maria
Maria
tie-
2-dat
m-
1-acc
a
has
prezentat
introduced
Maria has introduced me to you.
6.4 Deriving the ultrastrong PCC
In addition to the Me-First effects noted above for Romanian, for some speakers of
Spanish (see Perlmutter, 1971: p. 26) and also for Classical Arabic,22 in addition to the
22 As reported in Bonet (1991, note 8, p. 184).298 A. Nevins
Me-First effects ruling out <3 1> and <2 1>, the combination <3 2> is also banned.
The “ultrastrong PCC” is thus a combination of the Me-First PCC together with the
weak PCC.
The following pattern in Classical Arabic is reported by Abdelkader Fassi-Fehri
(pers. comm., November 2005; see Fassi-Fehri, 1988: 116 for the starred examples as
part of his proposal for a Person Constraint that demands 1 > 2 > 3):
(71) *Pact .a:-ka-ni:
gave.3subj-2dat-1acc
He gave me to you. *< 2 1>
(72) *Pact .ay-ta-hu:-ni:
gave-2subj-3dat-1acc
You gave me to him. *< 3 1>
(73) *Pact .ay-tu-hu:-ka:
gave-1subj-3dat-2acc
I gave you to him. *< 3 2>
(74) Pact .a-ni:-ka
gave.3subj-1dat-2acc
He gave you to me. < 1 2>
(75) Pact .ay-ta-ni:-hi:
gave-2subj-1dat-3acc
You gave him to me. < 1 3>
(76) Pact .ay-tu-ka-hi:
gave-1subj-2dat-3acc
I gave him to you. < 2 3>
This contains the Me-First pattern of Romanian, but unlike Romanian, Classical Ara-
bic contains a Weak PCC banning <3 2> in addition. I will call this an “Ultrastrong
PCC” as it requires that the Probe contain an additional relativization of Marked
[Participant], as in the weak PCC cases shown in (64), which adds the restrictions
afforded by the weak PCC. Note that this is a welcome result: the Me-First + *< 3
2 > PCC requires two separate relativizations, one for marked [Author] and one for
marked [Participant], and this may help explain its relative rarity.
This constraint arises when there is a relativization on the Probe to agree with
marked values of [Author] and with marked values of [Participant], which are the
positive values according to (47). For a convergent derivation to occur, therefore,
the following condition must be met (CA): there cannot be any unmarked values of
[Author]norcantherebeanyunmarkedvaluesof[Participant]thatintervenebetween
the Probe and elements within the featural speciﬁcations it is looking for. The possi-
bilities for clitic ordering (with left-to-right indicating dominance, i.e., dative on the
left and accusative on the right) are given below, and, in each case, an ‘x’ indicates
that the conﬁguration fails to meet a condition on Multiple Agree. The parenthesized
value next to the ‘x’ indicates which unmarked feature [Auth] or [Part] has incurred
an intervention yielding a locality violation.The representation of third person 299
(77) Ultrastrong PCC. Relativization: Marked [Auth], and Marked [Part].
CA MV
  1 3
  1 2
2 1 x ([Auth])
  2 3
3 1 x ([Auth,Part])
3 2 x ([Part])
To summarize the Ultrastrong PCC intuition, the Probe is searching for marked
values of Auth and Participant. Conﬁgurations such as <3 1> and <2 1> consti-
tute violations of the Contiguous Agree domain, because a non-marked value of
[Auth] interrupts the Agreement span. Conﬁgurations such as <3 1> and <3 2>
constitute violations of the Contiguous Agree domain, because a non-marked value
of [Part] interrupts the Agreement span. Independent of the particular implementa-
tionintermsofMultipleAgreegivenhere,thegenerallogicbehindtheanalysisofthe
UltrastrongPCCgivenhereisthatgiventhefeatures[Auth]and[Part],amarkedvalue
of either of these features cannot be on only the lower argument within the domain of
the vP.
6.5 Considering the typology of PCC effects
We can thus reconsider the typology of PCC effects according to the parametric
options of all, contrastive, and marked values of {[±Part],[±Auth]}. Relativization
to all values is the most permissive, and a language in which the probe allows all
values of both [±Part] and [±Auth] has no PCC effects. Relativization to marked
values is more restrictive than relativization to contrastive values, as it admits fewer
potential arguments in the agreement domain. Finally, in considering the “weak”
versus “strong” PCC, we may conclude that a Probe relativization of [Auth] is more
restrictive (“stronger”) than a relativization of [Part].
The various combinatorial possibilities of parametric visibility speciﬁcations of
[Participant] and [Author] on the Probe are shown in the following table.
(78) Combinatorial possibilities yielding a PCC typology
All [Auth] Contrastive [Auth] Marked [Auth]
All [Part] No PCC Strong PCC Me-First with <3 2>
ok (Romanian)
Contrastive [Part] “Me-Last” Logically Impossible Logically Impossible
Marked [Part] Weak PCC Strong PCC Ultrastrong PCC
(Classical Arabic)
A brief comment will be made here on the appearance of strong PCC twice in the
table. Note that in (65), we formulated a relativization to Contrastive [Author] as
responsible for the Strong PCC. The effect of including an additional relativization to
Marked [Part] will yield no further restrictions.
There is one more aspect of the typology that requires discussion. It appears that
the set of possible relativizations within the languages we are considering might not
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to contrastive [Participant] would thus exclude 1st person from the Probe’s agree-
ment possibilities. This relativization is logically incompatible with marked [Author],
as this speciﬁcation requires 1st person agreement, so the combination of contras-
tive [Part] and marked [Auth] is excluded, as it will result in no possible convergent
derivations.
Consider the combination of contrastive [Part] with contrastive [Auth]. By the CA
condition, this will rule out any 3-ﬁrst (not contrastive for [Auth]) and any 1-ﬁrst (not
contrastive for [Part]) clitic combinations. By the MV condition, this will rule out
<2 1> and <2 3> combinations, as the former will disagree in contrastive values for
[Auth] and the latter will disagree in contrastive values for [Part].
(79) Contrastive [Part] and Contrastive [Auth]
CA MV
1 3 x
1 2 x
2 1 x
2 3 x
3 1 x
3 2 x
Thiscombinationthusalsoyieldsnoconvergentderivations,soismarkedasLogically
Impossible.
Finally, consider contrastive [Part] on its own, with all values of [Auth] visible. This
willonlyallowthecliticsequences<21>and<31>.Iwillcallthissystema“me-last”
system:ifthereisadirectobject,thenitmustbe1stperson;andifthereisa1stperson,
it must be the direct object. This system is unattested at present, but predicted to exist
(though admittedly, it does seem a bit strange).
To summarize the typological possibilities, the two person features we have con-
sidered here, and the three relativization possibilities, yield all of the attested range of
PCC effects,23 and seem perhaps to overgenerate mildly in predicting one additional,
as yet unattested case of PCC effects.
6.6 Unattested but logically possible PCC effects
In this subsection we consider three logically possible but unattested PCC effects, and
show how they are impossible to capture in the featural system developed here.
First, recall that there is a Me-First PCC, which requires that [+Auth] accusative
cannot be dominated by [ Auth] dative, thus banning the conﬁgurations <3 1> and
<2 1> (while still allowing <3 2> in the case of Romanian). From a descriptive
standpoint, it is logically possible that there should be a “You-ﬁrst” PCC:
(80) You-First PCC: A second person accusative cannot be dominated by a non-sec-
ond person dative, e.g.: *<3 2>, *<1 2>, but <3 1> is permissible.
Such a system is unattested and predicted to be impossible here. The reason that
a You-First PCC could not exist is because, given our features, there is no way to
refer to 2nd person alone. The only person features are [±Auth] and [±Part], and the
23 Though my exempliﬁcation of these phenomena are mostly conﬁned to Indo-European and Ara-
bic, the PCC is typologically attested in a very wide range of languages; I refer the reader to Bonet
(1991), who discusses the Strong PCC in Basque and Georgian, and to the sources I discuss in Sect.
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only value-relativized parameterizations are to Marked, Contrastive, or All values
of one of these features. While Me-First effects can be derived because 1st person
is Marked [Auth], putative You-First effects cannot be derived because there is no
Marked feature value that corresponds exclusively to 2nd person.
Second, recall that there is the weak PCC, which requires that a [+Part] accusa-
tive cannot be dominated by a [ Part] dative, thus banning the conﬁgurations <3 1>
and <3 2>. The Weak PCC essentially bans a 3rd dative whenever the accusative is
non-3rd:
(81) Weak PCC: No 3rd dative when accusative is not 3rd, e.g., *<3 1> and *<3 2>
but <2 1> and <1 2> permissible.
It is thus logically possible that there could be a PCC that ruled out 1st person datives
when the accusative is non-1st, called the “Me & Nobody PCC”.
(82) Me&Nobody PCC: No 1st dative when accusative is not 1st, e.g.: *<1 2> and
*<1 3> but <3 2> and <2 3> permissible.
TheWeakPCCisderivedinthepresentsystemduetorelativizationtomarked[+Par-
ticipant]. The value [+Participant] groups together 1st and 2nd person as a natural
class sharing a marked feature, and the weak PCC disallows the persons sharing this
marked feature from being dominated by an argument that does not bear this marked
feature.ThereisnowaytoderivetheMe&NobodyPCCin(10)inourfeaturesystem,
because there 2nd person and 3rd person do not constitute a natural class that shares
a marked feature.
Finally, recall that there is a Strong PCC, which bans *<1 2> and *<2 1> because
they differ in their value for the contrastive feature [±Auth]. We could imagine a
similar PCC that disallowed any combination of 1st and 3rd person, called the “No
Me & Him PCC”.
(83) Strong PCC: No combinations of contrastive [Auth] with different values
allowed, e.g., *<1 2> and *<2 1> but <2 3> and <1 3> permissible.
(84) NoMe&HimPCC:Nocombinationsofcontrastive[Auth]withdifferentvalues
allowed, e.g., *<1 3> and *<3 1> but <1 2> and <3 2> permissible.
However, the No Me & Him PCC system in (84) is ruled out because, given our
features, 1st and 3rd person are not a natural class that shares a contrastive feature.
All three of these imaginable PCCs in (80), (82) and (84) are, to my knowledge,
unattested. The feature system here thus makes three falsiﬁable predictions about
impossible PCCs. This is exactly what one should want from a feature system for
Person: one that generates all of the attested patterns and makes predictions about
logically possible but UG-impossible patterns.
6.7 Interim summary
We have thus considered an account of the range of crosslinguistic PCC effects that
does not rely upon the 3noP view, and contains full speciﬁcation of features for all
clitics/pronouns, yet allows for ﬂexibility and variation in the functional heads that
controlagreement,whichmaybearvaryingdegreesofparametrizationastothevalues
they will allow in Multiple Agree scenarios when there are two arguments within the
domain. In the next sections, we explore related questions that arise given a proposal
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7 Why [±Hearer] probably does not exist
The deﬁnitions of contrastiveness and markedness and how they are used to single
outparticularcombinationsoffeaturesheredependveryheavilyonthefeaturalspec-
iﬁcations I have adopted for person, namely [Participant] and [Author]. It is therefore
important to explore what would happen with a different feature system. In particu-
lar, one might wonder about a binary feature that speciﬁcally creates an opposition
between 2nd person and non-2nd person.
One of the few morphologically motivated arguments for such a feature is syncre-
tismbetween1stand3rdperson,whichsharetheputativevalue[ 2nd].Nevins(2003)
argues that the Germanic instantiation of this syncretism should be handled by an
impoverishment rule, rather than being the consequence of idiosyncratic vocabulary
items speciﬁed for [ 2]. A markedness-based impoverishment rule which renders 1st
person featurally identical to 3rd enforces the rigidity of this syncretism and disallows
innovation of a new 1st-speciﬁc vocabulary item.24 Therefore no appeal to [±2] is
needed for this case.
Despite the paucity of morphologically based motivation for the feature [Hearer]
(or at least, its independent necessity, given [Participant] and [Author]), it is impor-
tant to explore how it would interact within the current system of value-based
relativization.
In the ﬁrst section, I will demonstrate that for systems without an inclusive/exclu-
sive distinction (i.e., systems without “clusivity”), a binary feature [±Hearer] un-
dergenerates, no matter what the other features are. In the second section, I will
brieﬂy discuss the arguments for a privative feature [addressee] in languages with
clusivity.
7.1 [± Hearer] in systems without clusivity
Suppose we were to completely replace the feature [Author] with [Hearer] instead,
and simply invert the values, so that 1st was [ Hearer], 2nd was [+Hearer], and 3rd
was [ Hearer]. In addition, of course, [+Hearer] would need to be the marked value
of [Hearer], otherwise this would simply become a notational variant of what I have
already adopted here.
(85) Person speciﬁcations using [±Participant], [±Hearer]:
1st person = [ Hear,+Part]
2nd person = [+Hear,+Part]
3rd person = [ Hear, Part].
Under this system, the prediction is that there would be no Me-First system of clitic
ordering, contrary to fact (cf. (66)), and that there would be “you ﬁrst!” systems
of clitic ordering, which, as discussed in Sect. 6.5, are unattested. Thus, this system
undergenerates (and possibly overgenerates).
24 Nevins (2003) pursues a privative feature theory; however, a revision within the current system
is straightforward. In particular, assume that in the marked environment of Past tense, the doubly-
marked combination [+Auth,+Part] is deleted, resulting in insertion of the elsewhere [ Plural] item
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The second possibility to explore is one in which there were three separate person
features,namely[±Part],[±Auth]and[±Hearer].Undersuchasystem,therewould
be the following person speciﬁcations:
(86) Person speciﬁcations using [±Participant], [±Author], [±Hearer]:
1st person = [+Auth,  Hear, +Part]
2nd person = [ Auth, +Hear, +Part]
3rd person = [ Auth,  Hear,  Part].
The problem with this system is that the deﬁnition of contrastiveness in (45) cannot
be applied at all here, as there are no featural speciﬁcations that minimally contrast
in the binary value of one feature. It is important to note that having both [±Auth]
and[±Hearer]causesproblemsforcontrastivenessbecausethetwoareincompatible,
not because there are more than two features. Adding number and gender features
will have no effect for the deﬁnition of contrastiveness. (Unless there were some non-
UG inventory that ruled out combinations of certain persons with certain genders
or numbers, e.g., disallowed [ Part, Auth] and [+Fem] in the same feature bundle.)
Thus, the inclusion of [±Hear] in a system that already has [±Auth] comes from the
incompatibility, not from the number of features.
Since contrastiveness cannot be used to derive PCC effects, we can consider
other relativizations that could be used. Marked [+Part] would yield the weak
PCC, and Marked [+Auth] would yield the Me-First PCC, while Marked [+Hear]
would yield the unattested “you ﬁrst” system. However, there is no combination
that would yield the strong PCC given the existing conditions on Multiple Agree,
i.e., there is no way to rule out <2 1> and <1 2> using parametrization to marked
features only.
As a ﬁnal possibility, we may consider a system that replaces [Participant] alto-
gether with [±Hearer]. Clearly such a system cannot straightforwardly capture 1/2
versus 3 patterns in the morphology, though it is of course possible using alpha nota-
tion (cf. for example Noyer, 1992, who explores [  Author,    Hearer] as a means to
group 1/2 versus 3).
(87) Person speciﬁcations using [±Author], [±Hearer]:
1st person = [+Auth, Hear]
2nd person = [ Auth,+Hear]
3rd person = [ Auth, Hear].
Given these two binary features, we would re-evaluate which features are contrastive.
1st person is contrastive for [Author] but not [Hearer], 2nd person is contrastive for
[Hearer] but not [Author], and 3rd person is contrastive for both features. Note that
it becomes perhaps more difﬁcult to deﬁne markedness on features in a context-free
way in this system (i.e. to follow the intuition that 1st person is doubly marked, hence
subject to many more syncretisms in its environment), but we can tentatively assume
that the positive values of both features are marked.
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(88) Multiple Agree in a [±Author] and [± Hearer] system:
Contrastive-[Hearer]: *1 2 (by CA), *1 3 (by CA), *2 3 and *3 2 (by MV)
Contrastive-[Author]: *2 3 (by CA), *2 1 (by CA), *3 1 and *1 3 (by MV)
Marked-[Hearer]: *1 2 (by CA), *3 2 (by CA)
Marked-[Author]: *2 1 (by CA), *3 1 (by CA).
Note that to express the weak PCC would, at minimum, require a conjunction of
two relativizations (since none of the single restrictions in (88) rule out both <3 2>
and <3 1>). The strong PCC likewise requires a conjunction (since none of the single
restrictions in (10) rule out both <1 2> and <2 1>). We can summarize the possibilities
of relativization adopting the feature system in (88):
(89) CombinatorialpossibilitiesyieldingaPCCtypologywithonly[±Auth],[±Hear]
All [Auth] Contrastive [Auth] Marked [Auth]
All [Hear] No PCC You-last Me-ﬁrst with
<3 2> ok
Contrastive [Hear] Me-last Impossible Impossible
Marked [Hear] You-ﬁrst with Impossible strong PCC
<3 1> ok
The cells marked Impossible would rule out all 6 possible clitic orders. Regarding the
other cells, recall that since 1st is not contrastive for [Hearer], a contrastive relativiza-
tion for [Hearer] allows only <3 1> and <2 1>, yielding a “me-last” system. Note that
there are two other PCC possibilities that this system predicts, such as “you-last” and
“you-ﬁrst”, which are not attested.
However, the most striking thing about these combinations is that none of them
yield the weak PCC. That is, no combination rules out <3 2>, and <3 1> and allows
all other combinations. This is thus the major shortcoming of such a system. It arises
because there is no way to group 1/2 as having to precede 3, which can be straightfor-
wardly done with Marked [Participant] relativization, if one admits such a feature, as
I have done here.
To conclude this subsection, we have considered three possible alternative per-
son feature systems that involve the putative feature [Hearer]. A system in which
[Hearer] replaces [Author] undergenerates: as it cannot refer to the marked [Au-
thor] feature characterizing 1st person alone, it fails to yield the attested Me-First
PCC. A system in which [Hearer] accompanies the existing [Author] and [Partici-
pant] undergenerates: as it is overly featurally rich, 1st and 2nd person no longer
are contrastive for [Author], so it fails to yield the attested strong PCC. Finally, a
system in which [Hearer] replaces [Participant] undergenerates: as it cannot refer
to the marked [Participant] feature, it fails to yield the attested weak PCC. These
results are summarized in the table below, where   indicates failure to capture a
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(90) PCC effects as captured by varying Person feature inventories involving
[± Hearer]
Person feature inventory captures weak captures strong captures
PCC PCC Me-First PCC
{[±Auth],[±Part]}      
{[±Hear],[±Part]}      
{[±Auth],[±Hear]}      
{[±Auth],[±Part],[±Hear]}      
The feature [Hearer] thus receives no support from PCC effects. Its inclusion in any
system of person features yields a basic inability to predict the typology of attested
PCC effects within the syntactic approach developed here.
7.2 [Addressee] in systems with clusivity
Wehave seen in the previous section that[±Hearer] doesnothing butcause problems
in predicting a typology of PCC effects. However, we have left open thus far the fea-
turaldistinction between1stpersoninclusiveandexclusiveinsystemsthatdistinguish
these two categories.
Inunderstanding3-personsystems,Ihaveemployedthebinaryfeatures[±Author]
and [±Participant]. I would like to propose that languages with an inclusive/exclu-
sive distinction incorporate an additional feature, [addressee], which is privative, and
hence lacks a distinction between + and   values.25
(91)  F = ¬[+F]
a. [+Auth] = the reference set contains the speaker
b. [+Participant] = the reference set contains one of the discourse participants
c. [addressee] = the reference set contains the addressee
The features composing the person categories in a system with clusivity are thus the
following.
(92) a. [+Auth,+Part] = 1st person exclusive
b. [+Auth,+Part][addr] = 1st person inclusive
c. [ Auth,+Part][addr] = 2nd person
d. [ Auth, Part] = 3rd person
e. [ Auth, Part][addr] = logically impossible
f. [+Auth, Part] = logically impossible
25 Harbour (2006), at the time of writing, has independently proposed that the existence of imper-
ative verb forms that are specialized for an addressee (but which do not constitute a paradigm with
the morphological expression of hortatives or jussives) provides evidence for a privative [addressee]
feature.306 A. Nevins
Recall from the deﬁnitions that I have provided for contrastive (45) and marked (as
in (47)) that they only are deﬁned over binary features. The prediction, then, is that
[addressee] can never play a role in conditioning PCC effects. The prediction is thus
that a system with clusivity will never distinguish 1st-inclusive from 1st-exclusive with
respecttoPCCeffects.Thisisafalsiﬁableprediction,whichdeservesfurtherresearch.
As far as I have looked in ﬁve languages that both (a) have an inclusive/exclusive dis-
tinction,and(b)showPCCeffects,thepredictionisupheldforKiowa(Kiowa-Tanoan
family; DanielHarbour,pers.comm.,November 2005),Passamaquoddy(Algonquian
family;Leavitt,1996,BenjaminBrueningandConorQuinn,pers.comm.March2006),
Yimas (Foley, 1991: 212–214) Warlpiri (Pama-Nyungan; Hale, 1973: 332–338), Julie
Legate, pers. comm., May 2006), and Chinook (Silverstein, 1976: 190–194) for which
the authors make no mention of inclusive and exclusive 1pl ever behaving differently
with respect to ditransitive restrictions.
The only grammatical purposes of [addressee] are interpretive (in the sense that
the assertion that the addressee is in the reference set is interpreted), and to condition
syncretism (witness, e.g., the syncretism between 2nd person and inclusive-we found
in Algonquian preﬁxes, as discussed in McGinnis (2005)). I assume that [addressee] is
onlyactivatedinsystemswithclusivitywhenthereispositiveevidenceforitsnecessity,
following McGinnis (2005).
For the sake of completeness, let us consider here the consequences of adopting a
binary feature [±Hearer] for systems with clusivity.
(93) Putative 3-binary feature system
a. [+Auth,+Part, Hear] = 1st person exclusive
b. [+Auth,+Part,+Hear] = 1st person inclusive
c. [ Auth,+Part,+Hear] = 2nd person
d. [ Auth, Part, Hear] = 3rd person
e. [ Part,+Hear] = logically impossible
f. [ Part,+Auth] = logically impossible
There are two pairs that are contrastive for a single feature under this scenario:
(94) a. 1st-inclusive and 1st-exclusive: contrastive for [±Hearer]
b. 2nd and 1st-inclusive: contrastive for [±Author]
Thus, in a system with relativization of the goal to contrastive values, these combina-
tionswouldbepredictedtoberuledout.Nonetheless,wemightbeabletodismiss(94a)
and (94b) as impossible dative-accusative combinations in any event, on pragmatic
grounds (i.e. it might be odd for John to introduce us-inclusive to us-exclusive (since
the author is in both groups), and weird for John to introduce you to us-inclusive
(since the addressee is in both groups).
Importantly, however, under a contrastive relativization of [±Author] given the
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as 1st and 2nd person are not contrastive. This is thus a clear shortcoming of the fea-
ture system in (93). In the system for clusivity with a privative [addressee] feature that
I am proposing in (92), I predict no difference in the typology of PCC effects between
clusive and non-clusive languages. This is a falsiﬁable prediction that deserves further
research.
7.3 Interim Conclusions
In short, we have seen that the features [±Author] and [±Participant] are more suc-
cessful in generating the typology of PCC effects than alternatives which include the
binary feature [±Hearer]. I have proposed that languages with a clusive distinction
mayactivateaprivativefeature[addressee]forinterpretivepurposesofdistinguishing
1st-inclusive from 1st-exclusive and for purposes of expressing syncretism, but that
this feature plays no role in conditioning PCC effects.
Thefactthat[±Author] and[±Participant] yieldthetypologyofattestedandunat-
tested PCC effects more successfully than other possible systems of binary features
thussupportsinturnthemoregeneralconclusionthatthesearetheonlybinaryperson
features of natural language. Returning to 3rd person, then, it seems best represented
as [ Author, Participant]. In the next section, we turn to a difference between 3rd
persons and impersonals/reﬂexives.
8 The representation of reﬂexives and impersonals
Given the distinction above, all existing grammatical analyses that posit that “3rd
person has no person” simply need to replace this statement with the Probe’s search is
relativized to contrastive values of [Author]. As there is no [ Part,+Auth] pronoun in
theinventory,[Auth]isnotcontrastivefor3rdperson.Whentwocontrastivevaluesof
[Author] are found, Anagnostopoulou’s constraint on Multiple Agree can apply and
correctly rule out PCC conﬁgurations; at the same time, the features [ Part, Auth]
are present on 3rd person arguments, and this will avoid the problem noted in Sect. 1.
Thus, as noted above, we can distinguish the ‘weak’ and ‘strong PCC’ by relativiza-
tion of the search domain, placing the locus of variation within the lexical properties
of the Probe, rather than in wholly different syntactic mechanisms.
Theimportantquestionnow,however,isthefeaturaldifferencebetween3rdperson
andimpersonals/reﬂexives.Thisquestionarisesinanyfeature-basedsystemofperson
representation, though it does not ﬁgure into the proposals of Noyer (1992), Halle
(1997), or Harley and Ritter (2002), the most inﬂuential person-feature proposals to
date. My own remarks on the topic will be rather preliminary here. First, it is impor-
tant to distinguish between impersonals and reﬂexives. I will assume that impersonals
have disjunctive speciﬁcations, i.e., they syntactically bear all feature speciﬁcations
simultaneously, as proposed by D’Alessandro (2004):
(95) Interpretive possibilities for Impersonal pronouns:
{[+Participant,+Author]   [+Participant, Author]
  [ Participant, Author]}
Therepresentationalvocabularyforexpressingthisdisjunctivespeciﬁcationisopento
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for [±Participant] or for [±Author]. As such, they will trivially satisfy the Matched-
Value constraint, if it is to be interpreted as a non-contradiction in feature-values.
(96) Representation of Impersonal pronouns: [ Participant,  Author]
Note in (96) that a   value for a feature F is compatible with both + and   values.
Impersonal pronouns are thus differentiated from 3rd person pronouns in that they
truly are underspeciﬁed for Person features. Indeed, their interpretation, as shown by
D’Alessandro, is precisely that they are compatible with any antecedent.26and thus,
unlike the case of 3rd person pronouns (which we know are not [+Participant], and
hencearespeciﬁedas[ Participant]),itdoesmakesensetoclaimthatimpersonalsare
underspeciﬁed (see Burzio, 1986, Manzini, 1986 for proposals that Italian impersonal
si lacks a speciﬁcation for person). Impersonal pronouns can in principle refer to any
person speciﬁcation, though pragmatics usually strongly favors one over the others.
The consequences of this underspeciﬁcation-based implementation for the PCC will
be explored below.
In contrast to impersonals, the representation of reﬂexives is subject to a great deal
more crosslinguistic variation. When reﬂexives do not participate in PCC effects and
do not differentiate person (e.g., Bulgarian, Rivero, 2004), they can clearly become
assimilatedtotheabovestatement(96);theyaredisjunctive,likeimpersonals.27 There
are,however,languages,whichdifferentiatereﬂexivesforperson;inSpanish,thesame
1st/2nd clitic pronouns me and te which are used for dative/accusative are used for
26 Kratzer (1997) provides examples of German impersonal man being bound by a 1st person
antecedent:
(i) Wenn
If
ich
I
Kinder
children
hätte,
had
könnte
could
man
man
zusammen
together
Monopoly
Monopoly
spielen.
play.
If I had children, we could play Monopoly together.
(ii) Als
When
ich
I
klein
little
war,
was
wurde
got
man
man
nur
only
am
on
Freitag
Friday
gebadet
bathed
When I was little, one only bathed on Fridays.
Indeed, even the English translation of (ii) is compatible with an interpretation of the impersonal
that includes the speaker. D’Alessandro(2004, Chap. 5) provides an extensive discussion of the role
of Aktionsart and sentential aspect in identiﬁcation of the reference set of Italian si, which can often
yield a reading that includes the speaker, as in (iii).
(iii) Ieri
Yesterday
si
si
è
is
arrivati
arrived
tardi
late
in
in
stazione
station
Yesterday, we arrived late at the station.
27 RuraldialectsofBrazilianPortuguesehavegeneral-purposereﬂexivecliticswhileatthesametime
maintaining distinct object clitics (Nadir de Lima, pers. comm., May 2006). Thus, while (i) requires a
1st-person object clitic for a direct object, (ii) employs the general reﬂexive se even in the presence of
a 1st person pronoun and agreement.
(i) Você
You
me
1obj-cl.
viu
saw.past-2sg.
You saw me.
(ii) Eu
I
se
reﬂexive-cl.
machuquei
hurt.past-1sg.
I hurt myself.
These data, collected from speakers from Minas Gerais, support the grammatical possibility of dis-
junctive reﬂexive clitics compatible with any person while maintaining 1st-person object clitics at the
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reﬂexives. In line with the current proposal, person-distinguished reﬂexives bear the
same person features as their non-reﬂexive counterparts in the syntax (although they
differ in their Case features; see Bonet, 1991). Thus, in terms of the PCC, person-
marked reﬂexives are expected to pattern just like person-marked clitics with other
Case features.
Thus, on the assumption that the Dative is higher than the Person-marked reﬂex-
ive in the underlying syntax of the clauses that contain a dative and a reﬂexive, an
intervening 3rd-reﬂexive (which is [ Part, Auth]) will fall prey to the same violation
of the Contiguous Agree condition as an intervening 3rd dative: both lack contrastive
values for [Author]. As Rivero (2004) demonstrates, this prediction is upheld: <3 2>
and<31>sequences,inwhichtheunderlyingleftwardsdativec-commandsthe1st/2nd
reﬂexive, result in weak PCC violations that are identical to those encountered by 3rd
datives that c-command a 1st/2nd accusative.
(97) A
to
Ana
Ana
siempre
always
se
reﬂ
le
dat-3rd
antojan
fancy-3pl
los
the
mismos
same
chicos
guys
Ana always takes a fancy to the same guys. (Spanish; Rivero, 2004:496)
(98) *A
to
Ana
Ana
siempre
always
nos
1pl-reﬂ
le
dat-3rd
antojamos
fancy-1pl
nostros
us
Ana always takes a fancy to us. (Spanish; Rivero, 2004:496)
(99) *A
to
Ana
Ana
siempre
always
os
2pl-reﬂ
le
dat-3rd
antojais
fancy-2pl
vosotros
you-pl.
Ana always takes a fancy to y’all. (Spanish; Rivero, 2004:496)
Clearly, person-marked reﬂexives behave identically to person-marked datives and
accusatives. Returning to the representation of all-purpose reﬂexives and imperson-
als, however, we may note that by virtue of its disjunctive speciﬁcation, an all-purpose
reﬂexive will allow for a convergent derivation under Multiple Agree. A relevant
language in which to test this prediction is Bulgarian, which has a PCC for dative-
accusative combination (100).
(100) *Az
I
im
2-acc
te
3-dat
preporâchvam
recommend-prog
I am recommending you to them. (Rivero, 2004: 500)
Though we do not know on the basis of this example whether it is the weak or strong
PCC, let us assume it is the weak one. Since we can conclude based on the dative-
accusative combination in (100) that Bulgarian has a PCC, we may now ask what
happens if there is an all-purpose reﬂexive present in the domain of v.
Suppose we interpret (100) to indicate the Bulgarian has the weak PCC. Given a
relativization of the Probe to marked values of [Participant], a downstairs all-purpose
reﬂexive need not be included in the domain of Multiple Agree: by bearing no value
for [Participant] or [Author], indeed, the all-purpose reﬂexive remains outside of the
domain of Agree. Thus, the Contiguous Agree condition is trivially met, as neither
argument is within the domain.28 Thus, all-purpose reﬂexives, even when coreferent
with 1/2 arguments, never give rise to PCC effects, by virtue of their lack of speciﬁca-
tion for [Author] or [Participant]. Indeed, any dative clitic can dominate a reﬂexive:
28 ConsiderthescenarioinwhichthisisastrongPCCeffect.Inthiscase,therewouldberelativization
to the contrastive value of [Author]. If the upstairs dative were 1st or 2nd person, by virtue of its
non-speciﬁcation, the downstairs reﬂexive would trivially meet the condition on Matched Values due
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(101) Na
to
Ivan
Ivan
mu
dat
(se)
(reﬂ)
xaresvat
like-3pl
tezi
these
momicheta
girls
Ivan likes these girls. (Bulgarian; Rivero, 2004:500)
(102) Na
to
Ivan
Ivan
mu
dat-3rd
(se)
(reﬂ)
xaresvame
like-1pl
nie.
us
Ivan likes us. (Bulgarian; Rivero, 2004:500)
(103) Na
to
Ivan
Ivan
mu
dat-3rd
(se)
(reﬂ)
xaresvate
like-2pl
vie.
2pl
Ivan likes y’all. (Bulgarian; Rivero, 2004:500)
FromtheBulgarianfacts,incontrasttotheSpanishfacts,wecanconcludethatwhether
or not a reﬂexive is underspeciﬁed for person will have consequences for its behavior
in PCC conﬁgurations. Thus, concerning reﬂexives and impersonals, there is no gen-
eral-purpose answer as to how they will behave with respect to the PCC: it depends
on whether they are person-speciﬁc reﬂexives or not. The predictions of the current
account are thus summarized in (104).
(104) a. Person-speciﬁc reﬂexives (i.e. Spanish me): behave like corresponding
accusative arguments with respect to the PCC
b. Impersonals and all-purpose reﬂexives: immune to PCC due to  -value for
[Author] and [Participant]
Importantly, then, although one of the major conclusions of this paper has been that
3rd person is fully speciﬁed as [ Author,  Participant] and that underspeciﬁcation is
inappropriate for modeling both spurious se and PCC effects that refer to these fea-
tures,impersonalsandall-purposereﬂexivescanbeunderspeciﬁedforPersonfeatures,
andinfactarerepresentationallydistinguishedfrom3rdpersoninpreciselythisway.
Returning to the facts at the outset of this paper regarding the spurious se rule of
Spanish, recall that we motivated the structural description of this rule as a dissimila-
tion rule, banning adjacent [ Participant] speciﬁcations. We are now in a position to
discuss the structural change that repairs this banned conﬁguration.
(105) Spurious se rule:
a. Structural description: [ Participant]Dative [ Participant]Accusative
b. Structural change: Delete [ Participant, Author] on the Dative
The structural change in (105b) removes the offending feature banned by this dis-
similatory constraint on adjacent identical featural speciﬁcations. The result of the
structural change is lack of a value for both [±Participant] and [±Author]. It is there-
fore not a surprise that the clitic that surfaces in this position is precisely the one
corresponding to the lack of these features: the impersonal clitic se.
9 Conclusion
I have attempted to present an implementation of Person-Case effects in terms of the
syntacticoperationMultipleAgree(Hiraiwa,2001)operatingwithinthesearch-space
of v on indirect and direct object clitics, and motivated an extension of Calabrese’s
(1995) theory of value-relativized parametrization in phonology to an illumination
of featural visibility in the morphosyntactic domain. Crucial to this account has beenThe representation of third person 311
the proposal that markedness and contrastiveness are properties of Person features
to which the grammar can refer.
The proposal that 3rd person is always featurally represented as [ Author, Par-
ticipant] has been shown to have three positive consequences:
(106) a. It enables an understanding of the spurious se effect as the consequence of
a well-motivated morphological dissimilation rule.
b. It enables a restrictive typology of syntactically-based Person-Case effects,
including the Me-First pattern of Romanian which disallows <3 1> but al-
lows <3 2>
c. Itenablesarepresentationaldistinctionbetween3rdpersonandimpersonal
pronouns that facilitates a contrast in their interpretive possibilities.
Person is a category with morphological, syntactic, and interpretive consequences,
and features are the basic currency of grammatical relations and operations. Cross-
modular representational commensurability is thus an important desideratum for
natural language, and for linguistic theory.
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